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Energy businesses are going through a series of swift and radical transformations to meet the growing
demands for sustainable energy. The integration of wind and solar introduces more low marginal costs 
suppliers to power markets, as no fuels are needed to produce electricity. Most power produced by
renewable energy sources is however variable and dicult to predict by nature, putting current power 
system operations under pressure and causing prices to fluctuate heavily. Increased competition, new 
production technologies and volatile prices completely changed operations in today’s power markets.
In this dissertation, we assess the integration of intermittent renewable energy sources in relation to 
agents’ risk preferences and decision strategies in short-term sequential power markets via a multi-
method approach. First, we analytically identify a technology-varying forward risk premium in relation to 
hedging needs of heterogeneous producers and retailers. Second, we empirically validate a multi-factor
propositional framework, incorporating various renewable technologies, and provide evidence for market 
non-neutralities between these technologies. Third, we indicate a convenience yield for flexibility in 
a developed experimental trading environment and empirically evaluate strategies of intermittent and 
non-intermittent producers in forward and spot markets.
With the ongoing decarbonization, power markets should provide adequate price signals for assets
and investments to ensure an ecient and sustainable energy transition. The work paves the way for
policymakers to investigate the implications of intermittent renewable energy sources on existing market 
structures and their participants’ strategic space. It further devises key ingredients for well-functioning
sustainable power markets, its design and governing policies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Energy markets are going through a series of radical transformations, with the demand
for affordable, reliable and sustainable electricity on the rise. Public concerns about
the adverse effects on the environment of using fossil fuels to generate electricity have
led to a, often politically motivated, increase of renewable energy sources in global
power systems. With climate policies at odds with the basic principles of the free
market (Mulder, 2017), it is key for a successful energy transition to ensure that
markets provide adequate price signals for assets and investments, ensuring security
of supply in an efficient and sustainable manner.
The liberalization of electricity markets and the integration of renewable energy
have a dramatic impact on power prices. The integration of wind and solar energy
sources introduced more low marginal costs suppliers to the market, as no fuels are
needed to produce electricity. Most electricity produced by renewable energy sources
is however variable and difficult to predict by nature, which in combination with
factors such as limited storability and variable consumption, puts current power
system operations under pressure and causes prices to fluctuate heavily. Increased
competition, new production technologies, lower prices and increasing price volatility
completely changed operations in power markets.
There exists extensive research on how producers, retailers and consumers make
decisions in power markets (see for instance Conejo et al., 2010). Decisions in electricity
markets are affected by uncertainty, as volatile supply and demand profiles may result
in price fluctuations or spikes, motivating power agents to engage in forward trading
in order to mitigate risks. In this dissertation, we address the effects of an increasing
share of intermittent renewable energy sources on price formation in short-term
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sequential power markets via a multi-method approach. Combining analytic modeling,
experimental simulation and empirical validation, the impact of the decarbonization
of the power sector is assessed in terms of strategic and risk related behavior, the
value of flexibility and market efficiency in relation to the design of electricity markets.
1.0.1 Decarbonizing Power Markets with Intermittent Renew-
able Energy Sources
At the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in December 2015, 195
countries adopted the first-ever universal and legally binding global climate agreement.
Governments agreed to ensure that temperature increases remain well below 2 degrees
Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Likewise, the 2030 climate & energy framework of
the European Union contains a binding target for EU member states to reach 40%
cuts in greenhouse emission levels compared to 1990 and a 27% increase of the share
of renewable energy in total energy consumption by 2030 (European Commission,
2018). As these agreements on the reduction of carbon emissions as well as advances
in energy technologies pave the way for reaching a high integration of renewable
energy sources in power markets, global investments in renewable energy are on the
rise. A record 157GW of renewable power has been installed in 2017 (International
Energy Agency, 2018), compared to 70GW in net fossil fuel generation. Recent market
developments push this transformation even further with a shift from feed in tariff
subsidies to auctions. This resulted in 2017 in a tender for zero-subsidy offshore wind
in the Netherlands, zero-subsidy bids in German Contract for Difference auctions and
subsidy-free solar wind farms opening in the United Kingdom. With wind generation
currently having the largest share of new installed capacity and solar generation the
highest rate of growth (International Energy Agency, 2016), this trend is expected to
contribute to an increasing amount of variability and uncertainty flowing into power
systems and markets.
Power markets are auctions where buyers (retailers) and sellers (producers) can
match demand and supply for a given moment. The supply stack is formed by
a so-called step curve, ordering short-run marginal costs of different production
technologies, as visualized in Figure 1.1. Producers on the one hand may depend
on different technologies, which vary on underlying fuel costs and other factors like
maintenance, load factors and policy support mechanisms (e.g. subsidies or contracts
for difference). The demand curve on the other hand represents the relatively inelastic
load of customers (Knaut and Paulus, 2017). Supply and demand are subject to
uncertainties and prices may as a result experience volatile and erratic behavior,
3Figure 1.1: Impact of technology on the merit order, visualizing the direct downward
effect of an increasing share of renewable energy on power prices in two time periods.
characterized by temporal patterns. Since the renewable energy trend and related
technological advances may amplify uncertainties further, adequate pricing in short-
term power markets becomes increasingly important for both producers and retailers.
Figure 1.1 visualizes price formation in competitive electricity markets and the
effect of technology with an increasing share of renewable power sources. Renewables
run at low marginal cost and may even bid at negative prices, when subsidies are
sufficiently large. They are followed by nuclear power plants, coal fired power plants and
several types of gas power plants, which run at higher marginal costs to compensate
for higher fuel costs. Power markets function according to the double auction principle,
meaning that the market price, set by the producer running on the margin, is paid to
all operating producers. As such, producer surplus is generated to cover fixed costs
for all producers with lower marginal costs than the market price. The direct effect
of pushing more low marginal cost renewable power on the grid, is however that the
expected power price drops. Multiple studies give evidence for decreasing power prices
with the integration of renewable energy. Sensfuß et al. (2008) indicate for example
that price reduction levels are significant in the German market and may generate
profits for consumers, simulating power agent behavior based upon the merit order
curve. Empirical studies confirm these results in for example the Dutch (Mulder and
Scholtens, 2013) and German day-ahead markets (Benhmad and Percebois, 2018). In
this dissertation, we study the direct negative effect on power prices in relation to
the intermittent character of renewable energy sources and relate to notions of risk
mitigation and strategic behavior in short-term sequential markets.
4 Introduction
Figure 1.2: Financial electricity wholesale markets with respect to time-to-delivery.
1.0.2 Electricity Auctions: Bidding in Sequential Markets
Electricity is traded in multiple sequential financial markets, which we refer to as
a set of forward and spot markets. Sequential markets may help with the efficient
allocation of resources for commodities that face uncertainty in price or quantity for a
future time of delivery (Ito and Reguant, 2016). Forward markets provide information
about future prices and allow market participants to adjust portfolio decisions for
future production and consumption. Given that power companies can often only
make relative accurate predictions for a limited time horizon (Borenstein et al., 2002),
forward markets allow for contract adjustment and risk sharing over spot uncertainty
close to real-time. An overview of the different sequential electricity markets with
respect to time-to-maturity is given in Figure 1.2. In this dissertation we focus on the
relation between short-term forward and spot contracts.
Classic financial literature defines a spot market as the market where the trans-
action is carried out in the same period as when the decision is made (Mulvey and
Vladimirou, 1992). In this dissertation, we consider the spot market to be such a
short-term financial market. We define the forward1 market as the place where agents
trade contracts for delivery of power during future periods of time ranging from one
day to several years ahead.
Most electricity is traded on forward markets, where market participants aim
to balance their physical portfolio through multi-year and month-ahead contracts.
Where forward contracts are typically traded over-the-counter via bilateral agreements,
day-ahead auctions allow market participants to trade power and adjust nominations
according to the double auction principle for every hour of the next day. When during
1In this dissertation, we do not distinguish between futures and forward contracts. Both contracts
allow traders to buy or sell electricity for a future time-of-delivery. Where forward contracts are
typically traded as bilateral contracts, futures are traded on organized exchanges. This means that
the value may change as time-to-maturity decreases, converging to the spot price close to real-time.
Given we focus on short-term contracts in this dissertation, we refer to both forward and futures
contracts when mentioning forward trading.
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Figure 1.3: Average daily profile of forward (day-ahead) and spot (imbalance) prices
in Germany in 2017, and according ex-post premium. Data from ENTSO-E (2018).
the day itself traders still anticipate any imbalances, short-term trading opportunities
on intraday auctions allow for trading contracts with a shorter duration on a continuous
basis, up to 5 minutes before delivery. Spot markets generally aim to adjust any
remaining imbalance in real-time, as the system operator settles bids and asks in
order to secure grid stability and reliability. Figure 1.3 gives an illustration of German
forward (day-ahead) and spot (imbalance) prices for the average of all days in 20172.
The illustration shows a typical daily day-ahead power price profile, with a peak
just before midday and another peak in the evening. Following Figure 1.1, these
peaks occur on moments when there is a high demand for power. We further observe
quarter-hourly spot prices to present more volatile profiles, fluctuating around hourly
forward prices.
We focus on rationales for price formation and variations in forward and spot
markets in relation to the decarbonization of power markets. With electricity not yet
economically viable to store3, the expectation theory explains the price of a forward
contracts to reflect the expected spot price for delivery plus a premium (Fama and
2For the purpose of this illustration, we used the German reBAP price, which reflects secondary
and tertiary imbalance prices in the German control area. For more information, see Regelleistung
(2018).
3The economic viability to store electricity varies per country and region. For example hydro
power facilities allow a certain degree of flexibility in power systems but are limited by geographic
constraints. Furthermore, the implementation of large-scale batteries remains low as arbitrage
strategies indicate only limited profitability (Bradbury et al., 2014).
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French, 1987). Let us define pt,Tf as the forward price per MWh of a contract that is
quoted at time t, for delivery in a future period T . Let Et(pTs ) be the expected spot
price at time t for delivery of the 1 MWh of electricity in time period T , with the
expectation subject to all information available in the market to all participants at
time t. The expectations theory states that the forward price equals the expected spot
price plus a varying risk premium, with ∆pt,T the expected forward risk premium at
time t to be realized at time T :
pt,Tf = Et(p
T
s ) + ∆p
t,T (1.1)
The expectations theory deals with deriving the forward price by modeling ex-
pectations of spot prices4 or forward risk premiums. Focusing on the latter, it is
usual to translate risk premium behavior to risk-related factors of market agents
(Borenstein et al., 2002). Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) indicate via a general
equilibrium model that forward prices are biased predictors of spot prices, and account
the emergence of risk premiums to the heterogeneous hedging pressure of producers
and retailers. Thereby, the forward premium in essence reflects the net hedging cost
of all market participants against spot price uncertainty in competitive markets.
Other factors such as limited arbitrage (Jha and Wolak, 2015), trading inefficiencies
(Borenstein et al., 2008) and strategic behavior (Murphy and Smeers, 2010; Peura
and Bunn, 2016) further also play a role in the emergence of the forward premium.
Several empirical studies have suggested the emergence of positive ex-post risk
premia5, with forward prices higher than realized spot prices for example, for different
times to maturity for the American PJM market (Jha and Wolak, 2015) and the
NordPool market (Botterud et al., 2010). Others find evidence for negative forward
premia, for example Cartea and Villaplana (2008) indicate backwardation in the
Nordic, British and PJM market and Redl et al. (2009) in the German EEX market
for various time-to-maturity contracts. Moreover, empirical studies that address the
behavior of forward premiums in relation to the impact of technology present mixed
findings. For example, Huisman and Kilic (2012) discuss significant differences may
4Lucia and Schwartz (2002) apply stochastic modeling to observe the seasonal behavior of spot
prices. They find expectations over spot prices to consist out of two components; an equilibrium
long-term spot price and a mean-reverting short-term price, and hence vary over time in size and
sign. They successfully find empirical evidence for the model using data from the Scandinavian
NordPool market. Other stochastic models indicate seasonality in both the size and the sign of the
risk premium (Pirrong and Jermakyan, 2008). As there is no clear relation between the electricity
price and underlying fundamental price drivers like production technologies in these models, we
focus on other methodologies in this dissertation.
5Note that empirical testing of the expectations theory is challenging as (1.1) presents two
ex-ante terms of prices that are observed ex-post.
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occur depending on the specific market set-up. Hence, they state that one cannot
apply the same model to all markets. As there is hitherto no conclusive view on the
role of such heterogeneous production technologies in forward power pricing, we apply
a multi-method approach in this dissertation to study the role of technology and
renewables in relation to risk preferences and strategic decision making in the context
of sequential power markets.
1.1 Main Contributions
Understanding relationships between market participants, renewable technologies
and decision behavior are of key importance for devising a robust well-functioning
electricity market, its design and its governing policies. Concerned with the effects of
increasing market share of intermittent renewable energy sources on price formation
processes in sequential electricity markets, the different chapters contribute to two
major emerging streams in the management science literature; sustainable operations
management (Kleindorfer et al., 2005; Drake and Spinler, 2013) and green information
systems (Melville, 2010; Loock et al., 2013; Ketter et al., 2018), and do so via a
multi-method approach.
First, we analyze the main functions of forward markets, future price information
aggregation and mitigating price risk, in a heterogeneous technological agent setting.
The work builds on equilibrium pricing models with risk-averse traders and provides
a comprehensive approach by including both high-cost (conventional) and low-cost
(renewable) producers. With uncertainty in both demand and supply, non-monotonic
risk preferences of producers and retailers result in a tipping point of the forward risk
premium with increasing intermittent market capacity. Next to showing the relevance
of introducing heterogeneous agents in power market modeling6, a numerical analysis
on the relation to other exogenous market parameters provides further insights.
Second, we explore market information asymmetries and technology non-neutrality
by studying different renewable technologies, namely large-scale utility versus dis-
tributed ’rooftop’ integration. Where the effect of information asymmetries between
producers and retailers on market efficiency is relatively well investigated (Bapna
et al., 2009; Gregg and Walczak, 2008), environmental transparencies of technolo-
gies are still underexposed. Moreover, relatively little work has been done so far to
understand the effect of heterogeneous renewable technologies on pricing and risk
6This in comparison to the seminal work of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), who model a set
of homogeneous suppliers in a closed system with unlimited capacity.
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behavior. We relate the differences in terms of producer and retailer risk related
hedging pressure and validate empirically by comparing short-term prices in two
sequential power markets: California and the United Kingdom. Where both countries
have experienced a pronounced increase of renewable energy sources in recent years,
they differ significantly in the degree of centralization. We contribute by investigating
implications for existing market structures, showing evidence for an opposing effect
on the forward premium, and their participants’ strategic space.
Third, an experimental market setting allows us to evaluate trading behavior of
intermittent and non-intermittent producers under truly ceteris paribus conditions.
Next to the established function of forward markets to facilitate hedging needs of
market agents, the literature also suggests that forward markets enhance efficiency
via strategic behavior in oligopolistic market structures (Bushnell et al., 2008; Peura
and Bunn, 2016). This second rationale is however still under debate, as different
authors discuss the instability of the result (Murphy and Smeers, 2010; Le Coq and
Orzen, 2006). We contribute to the discussion by developing an online experimental
market environment, simulating trading behavior under different market shares of
intermittent capacity. This allows us to spur innovation as it enables us to evaluate
market structures under various real-world conditions and alter market design both
from market and individual perspective.
Besides these main differences in primary focus, Table 1.1 highlights further
differences between the three main chapters in this dissertation. Combining analytic
modeling, experimental analysis and empirical validation, the research’ multi-method
approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding and strengthens claims to
validity (Brewer et al., 2006). Furthermore, the chapters incorporate data from distinct
geographical locations, based upon the applicability for each specific research question.
In terms of renewable energy sources, the Texan (on-shore wind) and Californian
(solar and on-shore wind) markets are predominantly characterized by utility-level
installations. The British and German markets on the other hand present a more
balanced mix of utility-scale and distributed solar as well as on- and off-shore wind
installations. Note that spot market design and auction mechanism differ slightly
per country and region. As such, the work in this dissertation attempts to give a
comprehensive overview of the effects of the integration of renewable energy sources
on market market efficiency and pricing in short-term sequential power markets.
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1.2 Practical Relevance
The findings in this dissertation are directly relevant for practice and policy7. Due to
environmental policies, electricity generated by renewable energy sources is recently
experiencing a sharp increase with specific annual growth rates as high as 35%
(International Energy Agency, 2016). With the ongoing decarbonization, policy makers
need to devise measures carefully and ensure that markets provide adequate price
signals for assets and investments, as climate policy measures are often in direct
conflict with the principles of the free market (Mulder, 2017). Market rules should
allow to facilitate the renewable energy transition as well as enhancing the flexibility
of power systems, while ensuring security of supply. In this dissertation, we aim to
engage policy makers in efficiently evaluating sustainable measures in order to not
only facilitate a high integration of renewable energy sources, but also achieve it in a
flexible and sustainable manner.
The increase of renewable energy sources and their intermittent character moreover
play a crucial role in the investment decision making of power companies, both incum-
bent utilities and new distributed systems, bound by stringent emission regulations.
For example, in 2013 Germany’s second largest utility, RWE, posted its first loss since
1949. It attributed the 2.76-billion-euro shortfall to a write-down of its European
power plants and since losses continue to increase (Chazan, 2017). In the same year,
the country’s largest utility, E.ON, said that highly subsidized solar power was a factor
in their 14% decline in profits. As short-term financial instruments close to real-time
gain liquidity (Knaut and Paschmann, 2017), with increasing uncertainties on both
the demand and supply side, understanding risk-sharing and strategic behavior on
such markets becomes an increasingly important aspect of utilities’ asset management
activities in dealing with the ongoing renewable energy transition.
1.3 Outline
The dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter 2, we present a competitive
equilibrium model with two heterogeneous types of producer agents and model the
role of increasing intermittent production capacity and flexibility. We extent this
model in chapter 3, including distributed production at the retail side, and empirically
investigate the effect on sequential price formation in California and the United
7The main chapters in this dissertation have been presented for a set of different practical
stakeholders, policy advisers and governmental institutions. An overview may be found in the back
matter of this dissertation.
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Kingdom. Next, chapter 4 uses an experimental approach to investigate the effect of
intermittent production under truly ceteris paribus conditions, related to notions of
both hedging and strategic behavior in sequential markets. We conclude our work
in Chapter 5 by revisiting the main conclusions and providing directions for future
research.
In the following, we present a brief abstract of each chapter in the dissertation.
Chapter 2 - Abstract Motivated by the ongoing integration of intermittent
renewable production sources in wholesale electricity markets, this study focuses
on operations in sequential markets with producers operating under heterogeneous
constraints. We propose a multi-stage competitive equilibrium model to evaluate
the effect of a technology shift from conventional (e.g. natural gas) to intermittent
renewable (e.g. wind) producers on sequential price formation. We find a tipping
point in the forward premium, driven the non-monotonic behavior of risk related
hedging pressure from producers and retailers in relation to increasing intermittent
capacity. We explore the technology-varying risk premium in relation to demand,
as main drivers of uncertainty on both sides of the market. Our empirical findings
suggest evidence for hourly varying fluctuations of the forward premium, oppositely
affected by the level of wind penetration and demand. We furthermore quantify the
value of flexible trading strategies and find a first mover advantage for integrating
flexible assets. The work ultimately engages policy makers to adequately evaluate
heterogeneous technological operations and achieve a market efficient integration of
renewable energy sources.
Chapter 3 - Abstract While the influence of information transparency on market
efficiency is relatively well investigated from a market point of view, environmental
transparency affecting the capability of traders to accurately predict and gather
information is still underexposed. Power markets provide us a setting to do so, with
traditional flexible being replaced by intermittent renewable energy sources. This
takes place at both the supply side, from traditional to renewable power sources,
and the demand side, with the emergence of distributed renewable power sources.
We propose a multi-stage competitive equilibrium model, including intermittent
production on both sides of the market, to analyze price formation and the effect
of information asymmetry in sequential decarbonizing power markets. We validate
the model by analyzing data of sequential short-term markets in California and the
United Kingdom; two markets recently experiencing a significant increase of renewable
power, respectively predominantly in terms of utility scale and distributed sources. We
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discuss results and policy measures for creating sustainable smart electricity markets
in terms of analytics and IoT devices.
Chapter 4 - Abstract The ongoing energy transition has dramatic impact on
pricing and decision making in short-term power markets. This motivates power agents
to use forward contracts in order to mitigate risk. Pricing forward contracts however
is tedious and empirical literature has presented mixed results applied to markets
with different technological constraints. We study strategic decision making and price
formation in short-term sequential power markets with increasing intermittent supply
by developing a power trading environment. This allows us to implement variations
with a high degree of control. Intermittent renewable suppliers drive conventional
non-intermittent suppliers out of the forward market, making use of their relative
advantage of low marginal costs. In spot markets, however, non-intermittent producers
have an advantage as they can adjust their volumes flexible in respond to variation in
renewable supply and volatile demand. We find non-intermittent suppliers to change
their selling strategy such that they may retain profits when the share of renewable
supply in the market increases. We validate our findings empirically for the German
short-term power markets and provide insights on the convenience yield for flexibility
in future sustainable power markets.
Chapter 5 We revisit the main conclusions and findings in Chapter 5, discuss
limitations and give directions for future work.
1.4 Declaration of Contribution
Chapter 1: This chapter is written by the author of this dissertation.
Chapter 2: This chapter is joint work from the author of the thesis, Prof. Dr. W.
Ketter, Dr. L. Qiu, and Prof. Dr. A. Gupta. The author of this dissertation is the
first author of this chapter and has done the majority of the work. The theoretical
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Chapter 3: This chapter is joint work from the author of the thesis, Prof. Dr.
D.W. Bunn, Prof. Dr. W. Ketter, and Prof. Dr. A. Gupta. The author of this
dissertation is the first author of this chapter and has done the majority of
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data analysis and writing of the paper was done by the author of this thesis.
The second co-author of this chapter contributed by giving significant feedback
in terms of structuring, improving modeling aspects and writing of the paper.
The third and fourth co-author of this chapter provided significant feedback in
terms of structuring and embedding the work.
Chapter 4: This chapter is joint work from the author of the thesis, Dr. R. Huisman
and Prof. Dr. W. Ketter. The author of this dissertation is the first author of
this chapter and has done the majority of the work. The theoretical framing,
experimental design, testing and conducting of the experiments, data analysis
and writing of the paper was done by the author of this thesis. The second
co-author of this chapter provided significant feedback in terms of theoretical
framing and experimental set-up, and giving it more focus by rewriting parts of
the chapter. The third co-author of this chapter contributed by giving significant
feedback in terms of structuring and writing. This chapter is currently under
review at a top-ranked journal.
Chapter 5: The author of this dissertation wrote this chapter.

Chapter 2
The Sustainable Electricity
Tipping Point:
The Value of Flexibility in
Sequential Markets 1
2.1 Introduction
The future of the energy sector will, to a large extent, be formed by a transformation
of electricity markets, raising economic and societal challenges for traditional electrical
power systems. Where the vertical disintegration of utilities and the liberalization of
wholesale electricity markets have enabled greater market competition and reduction
of prices, electricity markets currently face a transition to meet the growing demands
1This paper won the Best Student Paper Award at the 2018 international conference of the
International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE) in Groningen, the Netherlands. The paper
is currently under review at a top-ranked management journal and parts of the chapter appear in
the following peer reviewed conference proceedings:
Koolen, D. (2018). Forward Trading and the Value of Flexibility in Sequential Electricity Markets
with Increasing Intermittent Supply. Proceedings of the 41st International Association for Energy
Economics (IAEE) International Conference. Groningen, Netherlands (10-13 June 2018).
Koolen, D., Ketter, W., Qiu, L. and Gupta, A. (2017). The Sustainability Tipping Point in Electricity
Markets. 38th International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS). Seoul, South Korea (10-13
December 2017).
Koolen, D., Ketter, W., Qiu, L. and Gupta, A. (2017). Market Efficiency and Design in Electricity
Markets Integrating Renewable Energy: Theory and Simulation. 2017 Winter Conference on Business
Analytics (WCBA). Snowbird (UT), United States (2-4 March 2017).
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for sustainable energy. The shift is complex of nature (Ketter et al., 2016a), involving
issues in multiple dimensions including eco-social development and environmental
awareness, next to issues related to the security and reliability of supply and critical
infrastructure. At odds with the traditional top-down approach in electricity supply
chains, these new developments are drastically changing operations in wholesale
electricity markets.
The integration of wind and solar power introduces more low marginal cost
suppliers to the market, as no fuels are needed to produce electricity, and power
prices drop as a result. However, the integration of renewable energy sources, which
operate at a variable intermittent production rate, increases the need for flexibility
in order to maintain the necessary pre-requisite of balancing load and generation.
Intermittent supply from wind turbines and solar panels in combination with limited
storability of electricity and relatively price inelastic demand, have caused prices
to fluctuate heavily. Key in the transition process is to understand relationships of
market behavior by producers operating under heterogeneous constraints (Al-Gwaiz
et al., 2016), in order to ensure that markets provide adequate price signals for all
assets and investments next to ensuring long-term security of supply in a market
efficient manner.
With adequate pricing essential for efficiently integrating sustainable sources in
electricity supply chains, we focus on the price dynamics of electricity forward and
spot contracts. Sequential commodity markets allow for risk sharing with uncertainty
over the good’s delivery price or quantity and allow participants to engage in hedging
activities to avoid spot market risks from volatile demand and supply conditions.
Hedging is however observed to be not fully efficient as persistent price differences are
observed based upon the notions of market power (Borenstein et al., 2008), trading
period (Longstaff and Wang, 2004) or operational market characteristics (Chod
et al., 2010). In the above setting, our study investigates how technological production
characteristics, i.e. a heterogeneous set of conventional and renewable producers, affect
price formation and producers’ ability to trade in sequential electricity markets. As
electricity is not yet economically viable to store, agents have to rely on expectations
or variation of the forward premium to link spot and forward prices in competitive
risk-averse markets. Modeling competitive forward and spot wholesale electricity
markets via a two-stage equilibrium approach, we find evidence for a tipping point in
the forward premium and quantify the value of flexibility with increasing intermittent
supply.
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Our paper makes several contributions to both theory and practice of sustainable
operations management in the context of sequential electricity markets. First, we
contribute to the growing literature on sustainable operations management, adding
to one of the key promises of this emerging stream of literature (Drake and Spin-
ler, 2013); to enable production systems to operate more efficiently with respect to
their environmental and social impact. We analyze operations in electricity markets
transitioning to high market shares of renewable production sources, by developing a
theoretical equilibrium model and study optimal forward and spot market positions in
order to validate market behavior under varying operational constraints. This allows
us to understand how market efficiency and trading by heterogeneous participants
may change in future market set-ups. We further study conduct a simulation analysis
to mitigate analytically intractable issues and find that operational characteristics of
producer technologies affect risk related hedging pressure of both producers and retail-
ers, resulting in a tipping point in the forward premium with increasing intermittent
capacity. With prior work indicating non-monotonic behavior of the forward premium,
albeit as a function of different quantities like demand variation (Bessembinder and
Lemmon, 2002), we explore the relation of the technology-varying forward premium in
relation to demand. We next include the notion of flexible trading, and find evidence
for a first-mover advantage in quantifying the value of flexibility. As such, the work
ultimately contributes to one of the key goals of sustainable operations management;
to engage policy makers in facilitating a high integration of renewable energy sources
in an efficient manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first review the related literature
on sequential market trading and relate it to the work on sustainable operations man-
agement in the power sector. Next, we develop a two-stage competitive equilibrium
model in which different types of power producers are active and conduct a numerical
analysis to investigate the implications of the model and relate to the Texan power
market. Finally, we include flexible trading to assess optimal market operations in
future power systems for both risk-averse and risk-neutral traders. We conclude with
a discussion on the contributions and implications, both from a market-economic and
policy point of view.
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2.2 Background and Related Work
There exists extensive operations management literature analyzing sequential market
trading for different commodities (Hankins, 2011; Secomandi and Kekre, 2014), with
operational and financial interactions clearly linked in the decision making of the
firm (Birge, 2014). Sequential markets help with efficient allocation of resources
for commodity goods like electricity, coal, oil and agricultural products, that face
uncertainty in price or quantity at delivery (Ito and Reguant, 2016). Our paper
considers a model with two sequential power markets, the forward and the spot
market. Both markets trade the same commodity, electricity, physically delivered at a
specific time slot in the future.
As electricity is not (yet) economically storable on a mass scale, it cannot be
carried from one period to another. As a consequence, the cost-of-carry relationship
that links spot prices to forward prices, by purchasing an asset in the spot market and
storing it for selling it later, cannot be used directly for electricity forward prices. Due
to the non-storability of electricity, studies typically model expected forward or risk
premium, taking into account notions of risk-aversion and hedging. The seminal work
of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) discusses the behavior of the forward premium
in wholesale electricity markets via an equilibrium approach. The model considers a
homogeneous closed system and shows that the price of an electricity forward contract
is a biased predictor of the expected spot price during the delivery period, depending
on the risk related hedging pressure of producers and retailers. A¨ıd et al. (2011) have
a similar approach, studying the relation between hedging and vertical integration
of firms in competitive electricity markets. Motivated by the decarbonization of the
power industry, we build upon this work in a heterogeneous producer setting with
suppliers operating under different technological constraints.
In recent years, a significant number of countries have experienced, mainly moti-
vated by environmental policies, a sharp increase of renewable energy. With renewables
currently accounting for more than 20 percent in global power production and ex-
pected to cover more than 60 percent of global power capacity growth until 2020
(International Energy Agency, 2016), the renewable energy turnaround impacts market
operations, trading and price formation, as new low-cost technologies are pushed in
the supply stack. As a consequence, sustainable operations are recently attracting
more attention within operations management (Drake and Spinler, 2013), for example
with respect to investment strategies (Aflaki and Netessine, 2017; Hu et al., 2015),
market power (Al-Gwaiz et al., 2016) and price formation processes (Gianfreda and
Bunn, 2018). With respect to the latter, previous research has however mainly focused
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on single-period decision problems and relatively little work is available analyzing
the effect in sequential markets. Peura and Bunn (2016) model forward and spot
trading in oligopolistic power markets with conventional, inflexible and intermittent
producers. They find that with increasing supply uncertainty, spot risk may induce an
increase of prices when trading incentives favor suppliers. Ito and Reguant (2016) also
focus on the strategic behavior in sequential short-term power markets, indicating
that incentives for flexible producers with market power to engage in limited arbi-
trage and prevent full price convergence are larger in the presences of intermittent
producers. In turn, we quantify the value of flexible trading and focus on evaluating
the technology-varying market price of risk as we consider future power markets with
high penetration levels of intermittent sources, where it is reasonable to assume high
degrees of competition (Li et al., 2015).
Integrating flexible assets is one of the key solutions to deal with the intermittency
of renewable energy producers and can be approached from various perspectives. Next
to the relatively well-known approach to consider the value of storage at different
delivery times (Zhou et al., 2015), price differences in sequential markets also provide
trading opportunities for flexible assets. For example, Wu and Kapuscinski (2013)
discuss how renewable operations can be optimized with respect to curtailment. Al-
Gwaiz et al. (2016) show that power market competitiveness is affected by generators’
technology and degree of flexibility. With only limited financial (virtual) arbitrage
available in wholesale electricity markets, we approach the availability of operational
flexibility as a prerequisite to exploit arbitrage opportunities from a technology-varying
forward premium. This allows us to quantify the value of flexible arbitrage trading in
sequential electricity markets with increasing intermittent capacity.
2.3 Approach
We consider two types of power producers, intermittent and conventional, supplying
one homogeneous product, electricity. We refer to them as zero-cost producers and
high-cost producers respectively and denote the set of the former as Z and the
latter as H. Zero-cost producers only have fixed costs and do not bear any marginal
costs for producing electricity. Most renewable power plants function in this way
and are dependent on weather conditions like solar radiation or wind speed. High-
cost producers bear a marginal producing cost increasing with output. This type of
producers reflects the more traditional set of power producers, a various set of fuel
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium forward and spot pricing in a risk-neutral environment.
producers in industry who use different types of technologies, like natural gas, coal or
nuclear.
Figure 2.1 provides a graphical interpretation of the price convergence in electricity
forward and spot markets. Demand is represented by the inelastic demand curve
D and supply by a step curve S, due to heterogeneous supply. For simplicity, we
depict only three different types of production sources in the merit order, but this
can be extended for markets with an array of different production technologies such
as solar, wind, hydro, nuclear oil and gas. FZ and FH represent the forward bids,
while QZ and QH represent the spot bids, respectively from zero-cost and high-cost
producers. In a fully efficient market, the forward price Pf equals the expected spot
price Ps, since market participants will agree on a price on the intersection of the
inelastic demand curve with the supply curve following a step function. The expected
spot price is in equilibrium equal to the highest marginal cost born by any of the
producing facilities. Deviations occur when the demand differs from forecasts or when
random shocks occur in the supply curve (Borenstein et al., 2008). The deviations
have an expected value of zero and the spot market resolves any mismatches between
demand and supply in real time. Therefore, when real-time demand is lower than the
forecast or when net supply is lower than expected, net transaction will be negative
and the spot price moves down. The opposite occurs when there is a positive demand
or excess supply.
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As empirical research has shown the emergence of systematic forward premiums
(Longstaff and Wang, 2004; Bunn and Chen, 2013), most literature considers the
forward premium to reflect risk preferences of various market agents. Interpreting the
interplay of risk related hedging pressure of producers and retailers (Bessembinder
and Lemmon, 2002), the forward premium is also referred to as risk premium. We
follow this approach in this paper, modeling the effect of heterogeneous technological
producers on the forward premium in a risk-averse market setting. In the second part
of the paper, we investigate how the resulting technology-dependent forward premium
induces risk-neutral flexible arbitrage, and model to which extent this in turn results
in market efficient behavior similar to Figure 2.1.
2.3.1 Equilibrium model
In order to assess optimal forward and spot positions of power producers, we model
the electricity market in a two-stage equilibrium approach. We consider N power
producers i that use different technologies to produce homogeneous, non-storable
electricity in a competitive electricity wholesale market. There are Nz zero-cost
producers and Nh high-cost producers in the supply side of the market.
N = Nz +Nh (2.1)
Zero-cost producers depend on intermittent weather conditions like the influx of
solar radiation, wind speed or rainfall for generating power. The production capacity
of each zero-cost producer is therefore represented by a random variable Ki, and can
be interpreted as a production constraint by nature, enforcing prediction and forecast
accuracy in the forward market. Although not all renewable production sources
operate in such way, solar output can for example naturally be ignored during night
hours, we focus similar to Ito and Reguant (2016) on the volatile and intermittent
production character of zero-cost producers when running at nominal production
levels. Total capacity is denoted by K =
∑
i∈Z Ki. With qi the quantity of electricity
produced by producer i and Gi the fixed operational costs, the production cost is
given by:
∀i ∈ Z; c(qi) = Gi (2.2)
On the other hand, we assume a convex production cost function for high-cost
producers. In reality, the cost function normally follows a stepwise convex-similar
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shape (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002), which is usually simplified to a quadratic
form to guarantee an interior solution:
∀i ∈ H; c(qi) = Gi + eiqi2 (2.3)
where ei is a parameter capturing variable cost efficiency. Note that producers
employing different production technologies have different fixed cost Gi and variable
cost efficiency ei. We assume Gi to be equal to zero in this work representing a sunk
cost thus not affecting the decision-making process.
There are M power retailers j that purchase power in both the forward and spot
market and sell it to end consumers at a fixed unit price pc. Since retailers interact
in most countries in the world with their customers via fixed-price contracts on a
long-term basis, we consider the retail demand side of the market as inelastic. The
end consumers’ total demand for electricity is D =
∑M
j=1Dj , where Dj is a random
variable representing the demand for retailer j. We assume the existence of Dj its
first moment and second moment. The price inelastic demand assumption is widely
used for stylized modeling of short-term electricity markets (Knaut and Paulus, 2017).
Retailers are required to meet the demand from end consumers, with the sum of all
quantities sold by retailers equal to total demand:
Dj = −Fj −Qj (2.4)
Retailers are price-taking in both the forward and spot market. They base their
optimal forward position on the expected spot position. For grid stability and security
reasons, electricity market operators do not allow speculators to operate in spot
markets, nor have contracts with customers directly. They are thus required to offset
any remaining position before real-time and translates a cost for market entry. We
assume a market where only producers and retailers are active.
At time 1, representing the forward market, each producer i and each retailer j take
their forward positions, Fi and Fj , respectively, where Fj < 0 represents a purchase
from producers, and Fi > 0 represents a sell to retailers. At time 2, representing the
spot market, the end consumer demand uncertainty is realized. Each producer i and
each retailer j chooses their spot positions, Qi and Qj , respectively, where Qj < 0
represents a purchase from producers, and Qi > 0 represents a sell to retailers. The
market clearing conditions on the forward and spot markets are given by the following
two equations, respectively:
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N∑
i=1
Fi +
M∑
j=1
Fj = 0 (2.5)
N∑
i=1
Qi +
M∑
j=1
Qj = 0 (2.6)
Using (2.4), we obtain:
−
M∑
j=1
Fj −
M∑
j=1
Qj = D =
N∑
i=1
Fi +
N∑
i=1
Qi (2.7)
2.3.2 Spot Market Stage
We solve the equilibrium model of wholesale spot and forward electricity markets
by using backward induction. Assuming that the forward market position is given,
we begin by analyzing the wholesale spot market equilibrium. Once the optimal
positions in the spot market are known, we work back to find optimal positions in
the future market. At time 2, the consumer demand uncertainty is realized, and the
forward market positions have already been made. The profit maximization problem
of producer i is given by:
maxQi
[
pfFi + psQi − c(Fi +Qi)
]
(2.8)
where the spot market price is ps and the forward price is pf . The first-order-
condition gives us the profit-maximizing quantity sold in the spot market for the
high-cost producer;
∀i ∈ H;Q∗i =
ps
2ei
− Fi (2.9)
The zero-cost producer operates under the constraint that he has to sell Ki at
time 2. The spot market position is given once the optimal forward position Fi is
known:
∀i ∈ Z;Q∗i = Ki − Fi (2.10)
Finally at time 2, the consumer demand uncertainty D and low-cost production
uncertainty Ki are realized, and the demand from end consumers are required to
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meet. The equilibrium spot market price is derived using equation (2.7), (2.9) and
(2.10):
p∗s =
D −∑i∈Z Ki∑
i∈H
1
2ei
(2.11)
The equilibrium spot price depends on all producers their respective ei and Ki,
but when a producer makes a decision, he just treats the price as given. In the spot
market maximization problem, a producer does not need to know other competitors’
cost parameters or total capacity when deciding its spot market position, since in
a competitive market each producer is just a price taker and treats the price as
given. Retailers finally are price-taking and required to meet the demand from end
consumers following following (2.7).
2.3.3 Forward Market Stage
At time 1, the forward market profit functions of high-cost producer i and zero-cost
producer i by considering respectively the optimal quantity Q∗i given by (2.9) and Q
∗
i
given by (2.10), and the equilibrium spot market price p∗s at time 1 are:
∀i ∈ H; Πi = pfFi+p∗sQ∗i −Gi−ei (Fi +Q∗i )2 = (pf − p∗s)Fi−Gi+
1
4ei
(p∗s)
2
(2.12)
∀i ∈ Z; Πi = pfFi + p∗sQ∗i −Gi = (pf − p∗s)Fi + p∗sKi −Gi (2.13)
Note that at time 1, both the consumer demand uncertainty D and zero-cost
production capacity Ki are random variables. Retailers sell power to end consumers
at a fixed unit price pc, so the profit function of retailer j is given by:
Πj = pcDj + pfFj + p
∗
sQ
∗
j = (pc − p∗s)Dj + (pf − p∗s)Fj (2.14)
We assume that producers and retailers are risk-averse and use a mean-variance
utility function (Levy and Markowitz, 1979). With µi the risk-averse coefficient,
representing a trade-off between mean and variance, the utility optimization problem
for producer i is:
maxFiΠi = maxFi
[
E(Πi)− µiVar(Πi)
]
(2.15)
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We consider a similar utilization optimization problem for retailer j. By solving
the first order conditions of optimization problems (2.12) and (2.13), we obtain the
optimal forward positions F ∗i (pf ) and F
∗
j (pf ), which are function of the forward price
pf .
Using properties of variance and covariance and solving the first order condition
gives the profit maximizing quantity sold on the forward market for every market
participant:
∀i ∈ H;Fi = pf − E(p
∗
s)
2µiVar(p∗s)
+
1
4ei
Cov(p∗2s , p
∗
s)
Var(p∗s)
(2.16)
∀i ∈ Z;Fi = pf − E(p
∗
s)
2µiVar(p∗s)
+
Cov(p∗sKi, p
∗
s)
Var(p∗s)
(2.17)
We find that optimal forward positions contain two components. The first term
on the right side of (2.16) and (2.17) reflects the response in the forward position to
the bias between forward and expected spot price. For example, when the market is
in contango, with forward prices higher than expected spot prices, market agents will
engage in higher forward position. The second term reflects the forward market position
to minimize the variance of profits to the bias in forward price. We indicate that, using
(2.11), the covariance in the second term on the right hand side in (2.16) and (2.17),
is higher for high-cost producers than for zero-cost producers. Consequently, risk-
averse high-cost producers engage initially in higher forward positions with increasing
demand and supply uncertainty.
Similarly the profit maximizing quantity for the retailer can be found.
Fj =
pf − E(p∗s)
2µjVar(p∗s)
+ pc
Cov(Dj , p
∗
s)
Var(p∗s)
− Cov(Djp
∗
s, p
∗
s)
Var(p∗s)
(2.18)
We find that the optimal forward position of retailers depend on three components.
The first term on the right hand side represents the response to the bias between the
forward and expected spot price. Note from (2.5) that retailers will take opposite
optimal forward positions to producers. The second term represents that with fixed
retail prices, revenues covary positively with wholesale prices. Opposite to this, the
third term represents that for acquiring power, retailers bear risk in wholesale markets.
With increasing intermittent zero-cost production, and using (2.11) more volatile spot
prices, the third term becomes dominant over the second term and retailer optimal
forward positions increase.
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For simplification we consider all producers and retailers to have the same risk-
aversity coefficient: µi = µj = µ. The optimal forward price can be found inserting
(2.16), (2.17) and (2.18) in (2.5):
pf = E(p
∗
s)+
2µ
N +M
[
−Nh
4ei
Cov(p∗2s , p
∗
s)−Cov(p∗sK, p∗s)−pcCov(D, p∗s)+Cov(p∗sD, p∗s)
]
(2.19)
The forward price converges to the expected spot price, with infinite number of
firms in the industry or if risk is irrelevant to all market participants. The forward
price differs from the expected spot price by the sum of four risk related terms between
brackets in (2.19). The first two terms represent high-cost and low-cost producer
sales revenue risk respectively. The second two terms reflect retailer revenue risk
and retailer procurement risk as indicated by (2.18), with the last term opposite to
the first three terms. With increasing shares of intermittent capacity, the first and
third term experience a linear increase of hedging pressure, whereas the second and
fourth term experience an quadratic effect, due to the dependence on both supply
and demand uncertainty. Inserting (2.11), we can simplify (2.19) further:
pf = E(p
∗
s) +
µNh
(N +M)2ei
[
Cov(p∗2s , p
∗
s)− 2pcVar(p∗s)−
pc4ei
Nh
Cov(K, p∗s)
]
(2.20)
2.4 Numerical Analysis
We illustrate the implications of the model with a set of numerical simulations.
Empirical testing of the postulate is constrained since the integration of intermittent
renewable power sources is a very recent phenomenon and data is scarce. The results
of the simulation are illustrative for the relative performance of the forward premium
in relation to a changing production technology mix. The absolute numbers are as
such not of importance, we follow Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) for comparison,
but shed light on the relative performance via a sensitivity analysis. The aim is to
derive qualitative insights and policy recommendations on efficient market integration
of renewables.
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2.4.1 Tipping Point
In an efficient commodity market, the forward price is an optimal forecast of the
spot price at contract termination in the sense that it will only deviate to the extent
of a random unpredictable zero-mean error. Following Kellard et al. (1999), we
denote the ability of forward markets to predict subsequent spot prices by taking the
distance between the forward price (2.20) and expected spot price (2.11). In efficient
commodity markets systematic price differences would cause arbitrage, leading to
price convergence. Although the specific nature of electricity leads to the existence
of no-arbitrage forward premiums, we first focus on the relative behavior of the
forward premium with increasing intermittent capacity from (financial) efficient
market perspective. The ex ante forward premium is defined as:
∆p = |pf − E(p∗s)| (2.21)
In equilibrium, total supply of energy is equal to total demand. Substituting (2.19)
in (2.21) suggests that the premium depends on the realized share of intermittent
capacity K/D ∈ [0, 1] in the market. Let T0 =
∣∣∆p(K/D=0)∣∣ be the equilibrium forward
in an initial market without intermittent capacity. We define the tipping point T ∗ as
the optimal share of intermittent capacity in terms of this original market efficiency.
T ∗ ≡ T0 + argminK/D |∆p| = T0 + argminK/D |pf − E(p∗s)| (2.22)
We run a set of simulations to illustrate the dominant risk related hedging pressure
effects in (2.21) with increasing intermittent market capacity. Simulating 100,000
demand realizations, the spot price is computed according to (2.11). Next, optimal
forward positions are calculated via (2.16), (2.17) and (2.18), rendering the forward
price via (2.19). Demand D is normalized with an expected value of 100 MWh. The
demand’s standard deviation is set to 10 (i.e. up to 10% of mean demand). The
number of producers and retailers are set to 100, with a risk-averse coefficient for both
producers and retailers µ= 1. The fixed retail price pc is set as 2 times the wholesale
spot price. For simplicity, we assume ei and Ki to be equal for all high-cost producers
and zero-cost producers respectively and we fix Var(Ki) = σ
2
K , in accordance with
distributions of production prediction errors (Boyle, 2012). Lastly, the cost variable
parameter of producers is set to ei=10, resulting via the derivative of (2.3) in an
expected spot price of 20. As such, the spot price is independent of the intermittent
market capacity share, allowing to evaluate forward premium behavior across different
levels of wind penetration K/D.
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Figure 2.2: Market participants risk related hedging pressure and absolute forward
premium with an increasing market share of intermittent capacity.
Figure 2.2 displays the influence on the risk related hedging pressure from high-
cost, zero-cost and retailers in (2.19) in price units and the resulting expected forward
premium. With more intermittent capacity in the market, producer revenue risk
increases, as volatility of the expected spot price increases. Initially, both producer
types have similar hedging pressure with increasing intermittent capacity. With wind
penetration K/D sufficiently high, zero-cost producers’ hedging pressure becomes
dominant, facing risks from both spot price uncertainty and supply uncertainty.
Retailer revenue risk follows a similar profile to that of high-cost producers, as
revenues covary positively with wholesale prices. Retailer procurement risk however
becomes dominant with high K/D, as spot demand becomes increasingly volatile.
Figure 2.2 shows that through the interplay of market participants’ risk related hedging
pressure, in sum the forward premium is decreasing for low levels of intermittent
capacity, reaches a minimum and increases for higher levels of intermittent capacity.
The function of the forward premium thus reaches convexity in K/D, resulting in the
existence of T ∗ in markets with high integration of intermittent capacity.
Figure 2.3 depicts relative forward positions for both types of producers with
increasing market share of intermittent capacity with respect to the bias in forward
price. At T0, relative forward and spot positions are equal for both producers. Forward
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Figure 2.3: Relative forward position of high-cost producers and zero-cost producers
with increasing intermittent capacity market share K/D, and bias in forward price
with respect to the expected spot price.
positions increase as producers face higher risk related hedging pressure with increasing
intermittent production. For relatively low levels of wind penetration K/D, and hence
little correlation between K and p∗s, zero-cost producers face lower hedging pressure
than high-cost producers. Figure 2.3 indicates that this results in higher revenues per
unit for zero-cost producers, as they do not face producer cost risk.
2.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The above analysis shows that with an increasing market share of intermittent
production, the bias in forward price with respect to the expected spot price decreases,
reaches an optimum and starts increasing again as the results of the interplay between
different risk related hedging pressures of the different market participants. We conduct
a sensitivity analysis in order to visualize the relative behavior of the tipping point.
Supply and demand uncertainty. The tipping point in the forward premium
with increasing intermittent capacity primarily depends on the extent of uncertainty in
the market related to risk preferences of market participants, both supply uncertainty
of intermittent producers as demand variation of end-consumers. Figure 2.4 illustrates
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Figure 2.4: Forward premium ∆p as a function of intermittent capacity market share
K/D and (A) percentage of intermittent production variation and (B) percentage
of demand variation. Design for comparison based upon Bessembinder and Lemmon
(2002).
the forward premium in terms of these two components. In Figure 2.4(A), the bias
decreases with increasing demand variation. This is similar to Bessembinder and
Lemmon (2002), who indicate that risk related hedging pressure of producers is
dominant over that of retailers with quadratic supply cost functions. Interestingly
however, we observe that with low demand uncertainty and high intermittent capacity,
the bias may reach a tipping point. The intuition is that, following from (2.11),
demand uncertainty and intermittent production uncertainty relate oppositely to
the forward premium. Hence, retailer related hedging pressure will be dominant at
low demand uncertainty levels. Figure 2.4(B), showing the forward premium with
increasing intermittent production variation, indicates a similar result. The bias
decreases for low intermittent capacity variation and increases for higher relative
variation. The intuition is that in markets with low supply uncertainty τK , producer
revenue risk is dominant over retailer revenue risk. With higher supply uncertainty,
wholesale procurement risk of retailers increases and becomes the dominant factor.
Empirical exploration of relation to demand. Market characteristics, fixed
in the simulation by exogenous parameters, define the degree of convexity and relative
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dominance of the risk related hedging terms in (2.19). The role of demand is thereby
particularly crucial, as the variation is one of the main drivers for uncertainty. For
example, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) also indicate non-monotonic behavior of
the forward premium with increasing demand, but find this result for closed systems
with homogeneous set of producers. In Figure 2.5, we explore this relation further in
our set-up with heterogeneous producers and uncertainty on both sides of the market.
The figure shows a sensitivity analysis of the k-contour curve representing |∆p| = k
with given share of intermittent capacity for demand D. We observe that the optima of
the k-contour curves in Figure 2.5 divide the behavior of the forward premium in the
K/D space. First, with high demand and low intermittent capacity, increasing market
share of intermittent producers results in decreasing forward premiums. Second, with
low demand and high intermittent capacity, forward premiums increase with higher
market share of intermittent producers. This suggests that producer risk related
hedging pressure is dominant in the upper-left part of the figure, whereas retailer risk
related hedging pressure is dominant in the lower-right part. With power demand
levels experiencing significant variations throughout the day (Knaut and Paulus, 2017),
an increase in intermittent capacity may therefore drastically impact the forward
premium.
We compare the qualitative result with power prices from Texan short-term power
markets. Summary statistics for our data set are given in Table 2.1. Two interesting
developments in this market drive the motivation to select the Texan market. First,
Texas is defined by a vast share of wind production resources, with in 2016 generation
accounting for 15% of total generation and a outspoken political target to rely fully on
wind by 2025 (Potomac Economics, 2018). Second, Texan wind farms are characterized
by specific daily generation profiles, with high production during night hours and low
production in the morning hours as a result of a specific wind stream in the West
(Potomac Economics, 2018). Figure 2.6 visualizes load and wind output levels for the
average day over the period of 2016. We observe that there is pronounced mismatch
between wind output and load levels in Texas. This allows us to obtain a high-quality
data set over a relatively short period of time, which is necessary to assume that all
other driving price factors, for example gas prices or number of market agents, remain
similar. Following the result of the simulation in Figure 2.5, we thus expect negative
forward premium correlations with wind during peak hours and positive correlations
during off-peak hours.
Similar to Longstaff and Wang (2004), realized ex post forward premiums can be
expressed as:
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Figure 2.5: Forward premium ∆p contour plot as a function of intermittent capacity
market share K/D and demand.
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Figure 2.6: Average hourly load (left) and wind output (right) for 2016 in the Texan
power market. Data from ERCOT (2018).
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Table 2.1: Price and market summary statistics, Texas (ERCOT) 2014-2016.
mean sd median min max
Forward price 28.65 31.80 24.23 1.18 2236.63
Spot price 27.32 51.81 22.35 −108.81 2038.82
Load 39481 9169 37305 24018 71243
Wind Output 4940 3074 4498 14 15722
pt,Tf − pTs = Et(pt,Tf − pTs ) + T (2.23)
Where the unexpected component of the forward premium T is orthogonal to
all information available at t. We estimate the effect of hourly wind penetration
predictions set at time t on the ex post forward premium via univariate OLS, parallel
to the approach of Longstaff and Wang (2004). As before, we refer to wind penetration
as the share of wind output over the load for every specific hour in time K/D. In
order to ensure the maximum likelihood estimator, we square root transform the
data to a near normal distribution. Hypothesis tests use the Newey-West covariance
matrix, robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Results are given in Table
2.2.
Regression results generally support our model’s predictions in Figure 2.5, with
respect to coefficient sign, hourly pattern and statistical significance. We observe
mainly positive significant correlations for the morning hours, with as indicated by
Figure 2.6 wind penetration levels relatively high compared to load. In contrast,
negative significant correlations are found for the afternoon and evening hours, where
load is much higher compared to wind penetration. Note that actual load may increase
significantly during peak hours in the afternoon and evening. Although the assumption
of quadratic costs in (2.3) may not hold any longer in that case, generalizing (2.11)
by following Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), suggests that our qualitative result
remains the same, indicating an opposite effect between demand and wind penetration
levels.
To conclude, our simulation results show that including heterogeneous agents is
key in competitive power market modeling, as the sign of the forward premium may
change dependent on the share of intermittent producer capacity. With uncertainty
on both the demand ans supply side, the technology-varying forward premium can be
related back to risk related hedging pressures of producers and retailers. The following
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Table 2.2: Hourly estimates of wind penetration K/D correlation with the forward
premium, 2014-2016. T-statistics in parentheses.
Dependent variable: pt,Tf − pTs
Hour Wind Penetration Hour Wind Penetration
K/D K/D
1 1.06 13 -2.40∗∗∗
(0.52) (-7.45)
2 1.84∗∗∗ 14 -2.54∗∗∗
(3.5) (-3.95)
3 5.45∗ 15 -0.17
(1.88) (-0.47)
4 5.03∗∗ 16 -2.52∗∗∗
(2.2) (-5.83)
5 1.54∗ 17 -0.77∗
(1.70) (-1.74)
6 1.74 18 -1.58
(0.97) (-0.87)
7 3.17 19 -1.79
(1.56) (-1.15)
8 1.50∗ 20 -1.41∗∗
(1.93) (-2.04)
9 -0.62 21 0.57
(-0.61) (0.54)
10 -0.17 22 -1.15∗∗
(0.47) (2.1)
11 -1.57∗ 23 1.06
(-1.86) (0.53)
12 -1.54 24 1.93
(-1.5) (1.33)
Observations per hour 1096
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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section discusses the rationale of deployment of flexibility, next to the rationale of
hedging, in sequential electricity markets.
2.5 The Value of Flexibility
In the present-day market context, the above model indicates a value for arbitrage
trading strategies in electricity markets transitioning towards a high market pene-
tration of intermittent renewable power sources. Although participation by purely
financial companies is still limited in many wholesale electricity markets, virtual
bidding has recently been introduced in several markets in order to enhance efficiency
in wholesale electricity markets by converging market prices (Li et al., 2015). Virtual
bidding allows market participants to arbitrage price differences, most commonly
between day-ahead and real-time markets, without physically trading energy. Pure
financial traders or virtual bidders are active in most major liberalized American
wholesale markets (Birge et al., 2017), whereas profitable financial trading strategies
have also been identified in for example Germany (Just and Weber, 2015) and Spain
(Ito and Reguant, 2016). Virtual financial bidding and arbitrage however only play
a limited role in current power markets, as price differences continue to persist in
many markets. This has mainly been attributed to market design issues and market
manipulation (Borenstein et al., 2008; Birge et al., 2017), high transaction costs(Jha
and Wolak, 2015), low risk-adjusted return (Li et al., 2015) and limited access to
capital (Birge et al., 2017). Furthermore, Ito and Reguant (2016) indicate that ex-
ogenous arbitrage is often limited in power markets as participation is restricted to
traders with production assets. We therefore consider physical flexible assets to be a
necessary requirement for traders to engage in profitable trading strategies from the
above indicated fluctuating forward premium.
We include the notion of operational flexibility in sequential power markets by
first considering a cooperation of intermittent and flexible assets. Combining the
ownership of these two assets in the same portfolio allows to mitigate the risks from
uncertainty from either side of the market in agents’ production portfolios. Second,
we consider pure arbitrage with flexible assets, in order to avoid distortions of market
competition.
2.5.1 Flexible Cooperatives
We consider the presence of energy cooperatives in the market, combining intermittent
production and flexible storage assets in the same portfolio. With intermittent capacity
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fixed, introducing energy storage in the portfolio of intermittent renewable energy
producers makes sense as it creates an incentive to store(discharge) energy for the
future, when the spot price is low(high). To derive equilibrium prices in sequential
markets with the existence of cooperatives, we need to find optimal spot and forward
positions of the cooperation in the market. We assume all zero-cost producers to
have the same maximum amount of flexible storage available C, with Ci the maximal
individual flexible capacity. We therefore keep the set of market participants the same
as in (2.1).
At the spot market stage, the positions of the zero-cost producer with flexibility is
updated to:
∀i ∈ Z;Q∗i = Ki − Fi +Bi (2.24)
Where Bi represents the amount that is stored in the individual flexible storage
capacity, for example a battery, at spot stage with B =
∑Nf
i=1Bi. As indicated, high
spot supply uncertainty renders high risks for all market participants. In equilibrium,
a zero-cost producer with flexible capacity will optimally utilize Bi by reducing his
own spot uncertainty:
∀i ∈ Z;Bi =

max
(
− Ci,−η(Ki − E(Ki))
)
if Ki > E(Ki)
min
(
Ci,−η(Ki − E(Ki))
)
if Ki < E(Ki)
(2.25)
The flexible storage position is a random variable with expected mean of zero
and opposite from the cooperation’s production deviation. To be stored, electricity
must be converted into other forms of energy and converted back to electricity when
called upon. The efficiency of the process depends highly on the technology used. For
example, see Dunn et al. (2011) for an overview of battery technologies, identifying
charge and discharge rate, lifetime and system costs as key performance measures for
the efficiency of the storage system. The storage efficiency, denoted by η, measures
the proportion of energy recovered after the storing and releasing operations. In
equilibrium, this represents an opportunity cost for the cooperation, as part of the
stored energy is not resold in the spot market. The updated optimal spot price
becomes:
p∗s =
D −∑i∈Z (Ki +Bi)∑
i∈H
1
2ei
(2.26)
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At the forward market stage, we assume that cooperations are risk-averse and
use the mean-variance utility function to optimize their respective profit function.
Following similar steps as before, we obtain the optimal forward price.
pf = E(p
∗
s) +
µNh
(N +M)2ei
[
Cov(p∗2s , p
∗
s)− 2pcVar(p∗s)−
(pc4ei)
Nh
Cov(K +B, p∗s)
]
(2.27)
When we compare (2.27), where intermittent production forms a cooperative with
flexible assets, with the result without cooperatives in (2.20), we find a reduction
of hedging pressure related to supply uncertainty. In this set-up, high-cost producer
revenue risk becomes dominant over risk related hedging terms in (2.19) and the
forward premium would decrease monotonically with increasing intermittent supply.
The result shows the beneficial impact for traders with flexible assets over those
without, by mitigating uncertainty in the production portfolio. Intuitively, other
market agents would follow, minimizing the risks from supply uncertainty across
the whole market in equilibrium. In the following we therefore model flexibility as
separate trading entity, to isolate the impact of technology and flexibility.
2.5.2 Flexibility Trading
We next focus on flexible traders that speculate on the forward premium in competitive
sequential electricity markets. Each flexible trader is denoted by i belonging to the set
of flexible traders F . We update our model, given the presence of Nf flexible traders:
N = Nz +Nh +Nf (2.28)
A flexible trader, unlike a pure financial speculator, can assure trading capacity
up to his maximum production or storage capacity. Therefore, we limit the total
maximum trading position of flexible traders to W , representing maximum capacity of
the physical flexible assets in the trader’s portfolio. Flexible traders maximize utility
by acting as speculators in sequential markets, with in equilibrium, benefiting from
uncertainty in both markets.
In the spot market stage, each position of flexible traders is given once the optimal
forward position Fi is known:
∀i ∈ F ;Q∗i = −Fi (2.29)
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With Wi is the maximum individual capacity, which we consider equally divided
over all Nf flexible traders, the profit of speculator ∀i ∈ F is given by:
maxFi
[
(pf − p∗s)Fi
]
, |Fi| ≤Wi (2.30)
At time 2, consumer demand uncertainty and low-cost production uncertainty are
realized. Flexible traders act as price takers and hence the equilibrium spot market
price remains equal to (2.11).
At the forward market stage or time 1, flexible traders optimize their expected
profit, taking into account the optimal spot quantity in (2.29).
∀i ∈ F ; Πi = pfFi + p∗sQ∗i = (pf − p∗s)Fi (2.31)
Incorporating the positions of flexible traders, the forward price pf in (2.19) is
updated. Given that in the forward market stag, p∗s is unknown, as demand uncertainty
D and zero-cost production capacityKi are random variables, flexible traders maximize
expected utility. First, we assume flexible traders’ risk-averse coefficient µi =]0, µ],
with µ representing the risk-averse coefficient by all other market participants similar
to before. By solving the first order condition of optimization problem (2.31), we
obtain the optimal forward position for a flexible trader.
∀i ∈ F ;Fi =
min
(
Wi,
pf−E(p∗s)
2µiVar(p∗s)
)
if pf > E(p
∗
s)
max
(
−Wi, pf−E(p
∗
s)
2µiVar(p∗s)
)
if pf < E(p
∗
s)
(2.32)
Note that separating flexible assets from other agents implies that optimal forward
positions in equations (2.16), (2.17) and (2.18) remain the same. Filling in respective
forward positions and (2.32) in (2.5) renders the forward price with flexible trading.
When the maximum trading capacity W is not reached in (2.32) and ∀i;µi = µ, the
optimal forward equation remains similar to (2.19), only with updated number of
market participants according to (2.28). When flexible traders become more risk-
neutral, adding flexibility does not change the interplay between risk related hedging
terms of other market participants, but does decrease the absolute effect.
With risk-neutral flexible traders and enough available speculative capacity, the
forward price is equal to the expected spot price. However, in case maximum trading
capacity W ∗i ∈ (−Wi,Wi) is reached, the forward premium becomes:
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Figure 2.7: Total flexible trader profits as a percentage of the expected spot price
and intermittent capacity market share K/D (A) and contour plot (B).
pf −E(p∗s) =
µNh
(N +M)2ei
[
Cov(p∗2s , p
∗
s)− 2pcVar(p∗s)−
(pc4ei)
Nh
Cov(K, p∗s)
]
−W ∗i Nf
(2.33)
The negative sign of the second term on the right-hand side in (2.33) indicates
that adding speculative flexibility, will always decrease the difference between forward
price and expected spot price. Market efficiency by (2.21) hence increases with more
flexibility added to the market. Moreover, (2.33) indicates that there is not only a
value for adding flexibility in the market with an increasing share of intermittent
production, it also makes the labile optimal tipping point of highest market efficiency
stable, indicating the well-known short-term value of flexibility.
We visualize and discuss the implications of (2.33) in Figure 2.7 via a simulation
with the same set of parameters as before, in order to compare to the market without
flexibility. The Figure displays the total profits for flexible traders as a percentage
of the expected spot price with increasing intermittent capacity. With N in (2.28)
constant and Nh fixed, (2.33) indicates the absolute effect in terms of equilibrium
prices and profits for flexible traders. As we consider only speculative trading behavior,
enabled by reaching a threshold of flexible capacity, efficiency losses from energy
conversion processes are ignored. We assume flexible traders to be risk-neutral and
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all other market participants risk-averse with µ = 1 to clearly distinct hedging and
flexible trading opportunities. The share of flexible capacity varies from 0 to 5 percent
in terms of total market capacity.
We observe with increasing flexible capacity, first a monotonically increasing
investment incentive for flexible assets constraint by the flexible capacity. Once the
flexible capacity becomes sufficiently large, the arbitrage condition in (2.32) becomes
the dominant constraint. The value of flexibility reaches a tipping point and decreases
again. Moreover, the total value of flexibility also increases with intermittent capacity,
however decreases for very high market shares of volatile production, indicating the
tipping point discussed before.
The analysis indicates a first mover advantage for integrating flexible assets in
the trading portfolio. With storage technologies still economically unviable in many
markets, conventional technologies that are capable of adjusting positions in short-
time notice would typically benefit the most. Policy makers should therefore value the
product flexibility accordingly, and preferably give economic incentives to sustainable
solutions like batteries, in order to not facilitate unintended indirect consequences
from polluting resources.
2.6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we study how the integration of intermittent production technology
affects equilibrium forward and spot pricing in sequential electricity wholesale mar-
kets. Where integrating intermittent renewable production sources indeed provides
sustainable benefits, and helps to achieve political targets, their recent sharp increase
has pronounced challenges for integration in the electricity system. It is key that
markets give adequate price signals to producers and retailers, are transparent in
communicating the correct production cost of electricity, and appreciate the value of
flexibility in integrating intermittent sustainable energy sources. Taking into account
the operational constraints of production technologies, we combine analytic modeling
and numerical simulations to demonstrate how a large-scale integration of intermittent
production sources affects forward price behavior respective to risk related hedging
and flexible trading of producers.
We simulate the relative performance of forward and spot markets with the increase
of renewable intermittent power supply. Such sequential markets help with efficient
allocation of resources for commodities facing uncertainty from demand and increasing
intermittent supply. As operational constraints affect producers’ trading behavior,
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we analyze how market conditions define risk behavior of heterogeneous market
participants and influence the ability of forward prices to predict spot prices. We find
non-monotonic behavior of the forward risk premium in relation to an increase of
intermittent supply. The relative behavior of the resulting tipping point is related back
to the interplay of risk related hedging pressures between heterogeneous producers
and retailers and depends on producer technology mix, risk-aversity and variation of
demand and supply. We explore the technology-varying risk premium in relation to
demand, as main drivers of uncertainty on both sides of the market. Our empirical
findings suggest evidence for hourly varying fluctuations of the forward premium,
oppositely affected by the level of wind penetration and demand.
The model further indicates a convenience yield for flexibility in markets transi-
tioning towards a high integration of intermittent supply. We extend the model by
including flexible risk-neutral trading, next to risk-averse traders, and indicate a first
mover advantage for producers integrating flexible assets in their portfolio. As the
value of flexibility is derived from systematic differences between forward and spot
markets, it only forms a lower bound and future work may evaluate hybrid trading
opportunities arising from price differences with respect to sequential markets as
well as storage for different delivery times. Although, our model is simplified with
no curtailment of intermittent supply or market power, we believe that the main
insights on forward price behavior are robust to such extensions. Another avenue for
future research may be to explore the notion of flexibility or flexible cooperatives with
respect to issues related to transactions costs, financial constraints and market power.
With relative performance of spot and forward markets bound by the producers’
operational constraints, it is key for policy makers to adequately validate the effects
of sustainable policies on operations in wholesale electricity markets. In doing so, this
study calls for sustainable policies to adequately evaluate the role of flexibility, in
order for electricity supply chains to not only achieve a high penetration of sustainable
energy sources, but also achieve it in a sustainable manner.

Chapter 3
Technology Non-Neutrality in
Short-term Renewable Power
Markets 1
3.1 Introduction
Energy market participants face new challenges with the integration of sustainable
and distributed production sources, electric mobility, and related advances. These
are at odds with traditional power systems, where central, large-scale generation of
electricity largely follows inelastic consumer demand. One of the main factors in the
energy transition is the decarbonization of the generation portfolio, moving generation
away from conventional and polluting technologies toward production from renewable
energy resources, which are inherently variable and uncertain. Moreover, distributed
energy sources and digital advances have created opportunities for tech-savvy end-
consumers and prosumers to become increasingly, but not entirely, independent from
the grid.
Environmental sustainability, defined as ”development that meets the needs and
aspirations of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs” (Jenkin et al., 2011), is linked to ongoing sustainable economic
1Parts of this chapter appear in the following peer reviewed conference proceedings:
Koolen, D., Bunn, D.W., Ketter, W. and Gupta, A. (2018). Effect of Technology Non-Neutrality and
Information Transparency on Sequential Pricing in Decarbonizing Power Markets. 29th Workshop on
Information Systems and Economics (WISE). San Francisco (CA), United States (17-18 December
2018).
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growth and development. Even though sustainability does not have a cost and actually
pays in terms of innovation, productivity and environmental benefits (Elliot, 2011),
the engagement does go together with business uncertainties. Reducing uncertainties
is possibly done via developing smart markets (Bichler et al., 2010), using analytics
to increase market efficiency and individual trading. Innovations in Information
Systems (IS) can enhance this transition (Melville, 2010; Ketter et al., 2016b), using
real-time information streams and price signal to predict, analyze and steer bidding
behavior on financial markets. A prime example is the roll-out of advanced metering
infrastructure in power networks, increasing information transparency among market
participants and allowing for more efficient coordination between power generation
and consumption (Ro¨mer et al., 2012). As a result, such smart meters allow for
significant reductions of end-customers’ electricity use and costs (Dedrick, 2010),
as well as providing utilities with large amounts of data and information (Corbett,
2013). Despite these benefits, the adoption of Green IT and smart IoT devices
remains relatively low (Chen et al., 2011). This has been linked to a number of
issues and concerns on the consumer level, like privacy and control, attitude and
perceived usefulness (Ro¨mer et al., 2012; Wunderlich et al., 2012), however the role
of utilities and retailers remains rather unclear. As the latter face the challenging
task to maintain the reliability of delivered energy with fewer firm resources and
more uncertainty through intermittent production and decentralized demand at the
interfaces between the wholesale and retail segments, green IS may play a vital role
in collecting, transmitting and supplying data from sensor networks to automated
controllers, network and utility managers and consumers (Watson et al., 2010).
In this paper, we investigate the role of environmental information transparency,
defined by the capability of traders to accurately predict and gather information, by
evaluating risk attitudes of traders with asymmetric information aggregation in short-
term power markets. We thereby focus on the short-term forward risk premium, rather
than spot market processes itself, as it nicely reveals the balance of behavior and risk
preferences among producers and retailers (Bunn and Chen, 2013). In order to do so,
we study the integration of both large-scale and distributed (or ’rooftop’) renewable
energy sources, affecting both the producer and retailer side of the market. The former
are typically controlled by large utilities, often able to make relatively good short-term
predictions on the renewable production levels in their own portfolio. Contrarily, the
latter are owned by residential customers with little to no benefits from the retailer
perspective, facing high uncertainties as it is unclear what is exactly taking place
behind the meter. This study aims to investigate this information asymmetry, focusing
3.1 Introduction 45
on the effect of different renewable energy technologies on sequential short-term power
pricing.
Our paper makes several contributions to both theory and practice of operations
and information management in the context of sustainable power markets. First,
we contribute to the literature on buyer-seller equilibria in supply chains with an
asymmetric information structure (Esmaeili and Zeephongsekul, 2010). Pricing and
decision behavior in sequential markets of buyers and sellers depends on auction
design (Bapna et al., 2009) and incomplete information structures (Gregg and Walczak,
2008). This study aims to investigate the effect of information transparency on the
buyer-seller relation in sustainable power markets, where the individual agents and
their operational structure drive the degree of information at both sides of the market.
Second, we derive a theoretical and analytic motivation for our model, studying optimal
forward and spot market positions via an equilibrium market approach, integrating
both large-scale and distributed renewable energy sources. As such, we approach one
of the core questions of Green IS, finding the association between information systems
and supply chain performance from an efficiency and environmental perspective
(Melville, 2010; Loock et al., 2013). Lastly, we contribute to the emerging discussion
on an efficient market integration of renewable energy resources (Ketter et al., 2018).
We validate our model empirically for short-term power market in the United Kingdom
and California, two markets that recently have experienced a significant increase of
renewable power, respectively predominantly in terms of utility scale and distributed
sources. With increasing renewable energy capacity on both sides of the market,
the empirical results show evidence for differing information aggregation between
producers and retailers, influencing market behavior and price formation. Key in the
transition process is therefore to ensure that markets have tailored policies in order to
provide adequate price signals for assets and investments, ensuring an increase of both
large-scale and distributed renewable energy sources in an efficient and sustainable
manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss the related work on
forward trading in sequential power markets and propose a multi-stage competitive
equilibrium model with both large-scale and distributed renewable energy technologies.
We next elaborate with a set of simulations, which lay the foundation for our multi-
factor propositional framework on the effects of technological, fundamental and
dynamic factors on sequential price formation. We validate the model by conducting
an empirical analysis with data from short-term power markets of the United Kingdom
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and California from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2017. Finally, we discuss results
and implications and reflect by pointing out directions for future work.
3.2 Approach
The intermittent character of renewable power supply makes prediction accuracy
decrease drastically for longer time horizons. As a consequence, trading on most
competitive power markets is moving closer real-time, with new short-term financial
products becoming increasingly liquid (Knaut and Paschmann, 2017), and wholesale
power market participants may engage in forward and spot trading in order to mitigate
risks and uncertainty (Bunn and Chen, 2013). With electricity not yet economically
viable to store, traditional cost-of-storage models for forward pricing cannot be used.
This motivated Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) to model the electricity forward
price pf as a result of an expectation over the spot price ps plus a premium, modeling
the supply and demand side of electricity markets in a closed system. They provide
empirical evidence for their results from the American PJM market, but empirical
support is mixed when applied to other markets (during different time periods).
Other studies have assessed modeling forward pricing in electricity markets, but
also find mixed empirical support. For example, Longstaff and Wang (2004) conduct
an empirical analysis of the above model by using hourly prices and find that the
risk premiums are time-varying and directly related to economic risk factors, such
as the volatility of unexpected changes in demand, spot prices, total revenues and
the risk that the electricity transmission system reaches its capacity limit. Douglas
and Popova (2008) empirically relate forward risk premiums to indirect storability,
associating the forward risk premium back to gas inventory levels. Redl and Bunn
(2013) conduct a multi-factor analysis to study that the forward premium in electricity
is dependent on fundamental, behavioral, dynamic and shock components. Huisman
and Kilic (2012) also find evidence for the dependence of the risk premium on the
level of (in)direct storability in the market, comparing the Dutch (mainly gas) and
Scandinavian (mainly hydro) markets. They state that one cannot apply the same
model to all electricity markets, as forward risk premium behavior heavily depends
on the technology mix of the underlying production sources.
Analytic studies modeling the effect of (renewable) technology on sequential power
trading are recently attracting more attention. Influenced by market conditions as
flexibility, producer set up and risk aversion, relative performance of the forward
price pf and spot price ps is bound by the markets’ technological constraints (Peura
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and Bunn, 2016; Al-Gwaiz et al., 2016). We relate these notions to the effect of
environmental information transparency; with asymmetries between market agents’
ability to gather and predict information as a consequence of increasing heterogeneous
intermittent renewable technologies on both sides of the market. With the increase
of (intermittent) renewable energy sources in worldwide power markets only a very
recent phenomenon, to the best of our knowledge this paper is one of the first to
combine analytic modeling and empirical validation in order to analyze the effects
of both large-scale and distributed renewable technologies on sequential pricing in
wholesale power markets.
3.2.1 Equilibrium Model
In order to assess sequential power trading with increasing intermittent supply, we
model optimal forward and spot positions in a two-stage equilibrium approach, based
upon the work in the previous chapter and work by Koolen et al. (2017). The study
focuses on heterogeneous production technologies and models the supply and demand
side of power markets in a closed system. This allows to relate forward and spot price
formation processes back to dynamic risk preferences of producers and retailers. In
the following, we briefly revisit the model and extend it by incorporating renewable
technologies on both the producer and retailer side of the market. The complete
derivation of the whole model in this paper can be found in the appendix.
There areN power producers i andM power retailers j that trade the homogeneous,
non-storable commodity electricity in a competitive electricity wholesale market.
Retailers are required to meet the demand of end-consumers and sell it against a
fixed price pc. The demand of end-consumers is represented by a random variable
D =
∑M
j=1Dj . With each producer and retailer taking respectively forward positions,
Fi and Fj , and spot positions, Qi and Qj , the market clearing condition indicates
that total physical production of producers is equal to total retailer demand:
−
M∑
j=1
Fj −
M∑
j=1
Qj = D =
N∑
i=1
Fi +
N∑
i=1
Qi (3.1)
We distinguish between two types of renewable energy agents, characterized by
intermittent production profiles dependent on variable weather conditions. First, there
are large-scale utility producers, to which we refer as a set Z consisting out of Nz
zero-cost producers. They only have fixed costs and do not bear any marginal costs for
producing electricity. The production capacity of each zero-cost producer is represented
by a random variable Ki and total capacity by K =
∑
i∈Z Ki. Second, end-consumers
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have own production capacity in the form of distributed ’rooftop’ capacity. We refer
to this set of end-consumer as so-called prosumers. Total capacity is represented by a
random variable C, and can similarly to K be considered as a production constraint
by nature. We assume the existence of K and C its first and second central moment.
Note that the ability to predict and gather information on production profiles affects
the second central moment and hence may cause information asymmetries between
market agents.
Next to renewable energy agents, conventional plants that burn fossil fuels to
produce power are represented by a set H consisting out of Nh high-cost producers.
They bear a marginal production cost increasing with output, reflecting that there are
a number of production technologies with differing out-of-pocket costs (Bessembinder
and Lemmon, 2002). Increasing marginal costs are in correspondence with empirical
evidence that power prices are higher during peak hours than off-peak hours (Zhou
et al., 2015). With ei the variable cost efficiency parameter, Gi the fixed costs and a
the cost parameter, the production cost function is given by:
∀i ∈ H; c(qi) = Gi + eiqia (3.2)
We solve the equilibrium model to derive equations for the spot price ps and forward
price pf using backward induction. In the spot market, consumer demand uncertainty
D, large-scale intermittent capacity K and prosumer intermittent capacity C are
realized. Producers i optimize the profit function representing a trade-off between
revenue and costs. Assuming that forward positions are known, profit-maximizing spot
quantities are derived by taking the first-order-condition of the profit maximization
problem of producer i. Using (3.1), the optimal equilibrium spot market price p∗s is
derived:
p∗s =
(D − C −∑i∈Z Ki)a−1[∑
i∈H(
1
a.ei
)
1
a−1
]a−1 (3.3)
In the forward market, demand D and renewable technology quantities K and
C are random variables. We assume that producers and retailers are risk averse
and optimize their forward positions according to the mean-variance utility function,
representing a trade-off between mean profit and the variance of the profit. By solving
the first-order-conditions, we obtain the optimal forward positions F ∗i (pf ) and F
∗
j (pf ).
The forward price may finally be derived using the forward market clearing condition:
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N∑
i=1
F ∗i (pf ) +
M∑
j=1
F ∗j (pf ) = 0 (3.4)
3.3 Multi-Factor Propositional Framework
We illustrate the implications of the model with a set of numerical simulations. The
aim is to render qualitative insights that allow us to form a multi-factor propositional
framework for our empirical analysis. From the model, we seek to embed and extend
various factors introduced in previous work into a technology specific framework.
The results of the simulation may vary arbitrarily depending on a set of exogenous
parameters and are thus only illustrative for the relative performance of the forward
premium. The number of producers and retailers are set to 100, with a risk-averse
coefficient for both producers and retailers µ= 1. We assume normal distributions
for demand (µD = 100, σD = 10), zero-cost producer capacity K and distributed
renewable capacity C are normally distributed. The fixed retail price pc is set as
2 times the wholesale spot price. For simplicity, we assume Ki to be equal for all
zero-cost producers and we fix Var(Ki) = σ
2
K and Var(C) = σ
2
C to 10% of total
capacity. We further assume ei to be equal for all high-cost producers and is set to 10,
in order to maintain comparability across cost structures, and the respective shares
of intermittent production K/D and C/D.
For brevity and in light of the empirical evidence presented later, we only focus
on variations in the parameters of uncertainty. First, we explore the effect of hourly
demand regimes as peak and off-peak hours experience significant different price
formation behavior. Next, we focus on the effect of the non-neutrality of renewable
technologies on sequential pricing, relating the resulting information asymmetries
back to risk preferences of producers and retailers.
3.3.1 Time-varying Demand Effects
The non-storable character of electricity in combination with varying load profiles
makes that power prices experience significant differences throughout the day. This
in turn affects forward and spot trading, as literature has found evidence for the
hourly variation in sign and magnitude of the forward premium (Longstaff and Wang,
2004; Hadsell and Shawky, 2006). For example, Bunn and Chen (2013) show that it
is important to control for hourly shocks of fundamental price drivers in estimating
the forward premium. They indicate that mainly behavioral drivers affect peak (day)
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Figure 3.1: Aggregated bidding curves for the UK power day-ahead market, 26
October 2018, 12:00PM. Data from EPEX (2018).
premia, whereas more fundamental drivers affect off-peak (night) premia, reflecting
different strategic and risk preferences of market participants throughout the day.
Figure 3.1 illustrates aggregated supply and demand bidding curves at noon
for a specific day in the British day-ahead market. Note that the demand curve
only portrays the trading positions of market participants, and thus not reflect the
relatively inelastic demand of end-customers. It is clear that for the supply curve
on the other hand, different cost functions with cost parameter a in (3.2) need to
be considered. Where small demand deviations may only cause small price variation
during off-peak hours, it may cause much larger price volatility during peak hours.
We therefore discuss a quadratic and a cubic model in the following to explore the
hourly dynamics on the forward premium. Other geographic markets present similar
shapes for the supply curve, see for example Kohansal et al. (2017) for an overview of
aggregated supply bids in the Californian market.
Quadratic model Quadratic costs (a = 2) in (3.2) imply a linear supply curve
and thus link well to off-peak hours. Optimizing for the first-order-condition of
the profit-maximizing function in gives the optimal spot quantity of the high-cost
producer in the spot market, rendering the optimal spot price using the market
clearing condition (3.1):
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p∗s =
D − C −∑i∈Z Ki∑
i∈H
1
2ei
(3.5)
Using properties of variance and covariance and solving the first-order-condition
of the mean-variance utility function renders the profit maximizing quantities sold
on the forward market. The forward price is subsequently derived from the market
clearing condition:
pf = E(p
∗
s) +
2µ
N +M
[
−Nh
4ei
Cov(p∗2s , p
∗
s)− Cov(p∗sK, p∗s)
− pcCov((D − C), p∗s) + Cov(p∗s(D − C), p∗s)
] (3.6)
Cubic model Strictly convex marginal costs (a > 2) render a better representation
of the supply stack curve in power markets during peak times. We update the model
with a = 3 in (3.2), implying quadratic growth of marginal costs. Following a similar
derivation to the quadratic model, we find the optimal spot and forward price to
become:
p∗s =
(D − C −∑i∈Z Ki)2∑
i∈H
Nh
3ei
(3.7)
pf = E(p
∗
s) +
2µ
N +M
[
−2Nh
3
√
(3ei)
Cov(p∗1.5s , p
∗
s)− Cov(p∗sK, p∗s)
− pcCov((D − C), p∗s) + Cov(p∗s(D − C), p∗s)
] (3.8)
In both (3.6) and (3.8), the forward price converges to the expected spot price,
with infinite number of producers and retailers or if with risk-neutral traders. Similar
to Koolen et al. (2017), we find the forward risk premium to consist out of individual
risk preferences from producers and retailers, making the forward price differ from
the expected spot price. Where the first two terms represent high-cost and low-
cost producer sales revenue risk respectively, the third reflects that retailer profits
covary positively with expected spot prices while the fourth term represents retailer
procurement risk, with the last term opposite to the first three terms. Note that
we have three parameters with uncertainty in our model, demand D, large-scale
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Figure 3.2: Forward premium ∆p as a function of demand. Panel A shows the
relation to large-scale intermittent capacity for off-peak periods (a = 2). Panel B
shows the effect to distributed prosumer capacity for peak periods (a = 3). Design for
comparison based upon Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002).
intermittent production K and distributed prosumer production C. Where large-
scale intermittent capacity only directly influences zero-cost producers’ risk related
hedging pressure and distributed prosumer only directly influences retailers’ risk
related hedging pressure, they indirectly influence each other through volatile spot
prices. We run a set of simulations in order to illustrate the interplay of producers
and retailers their risk preferences with increasing volume uncertainty on both sides
of the market. This allows us to evaluate how asymmetries between these two types
of market agents in the ability to gather and predict information affects the pricing
of forward and spot contracts.
Figure 3.2 displays simulation results for the effect of demand and cost function on
the forward risk premium. Panel A shows that for quadratic costs (a = 2), increasing
demand correlates negatively with the forward premium. With increasing demand
correlating to increasing spot prices via (3.5), risk related hedging pressure of high-cost
producers is becomes more dominant over other risk factors in (3.6). As a result,
the forward premium will become increasingly negative with increasing demand.
This is similar to Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), who find that the forward risk
premium correlates negatively to the variance of spot prices and positively to the
skewness of spot prices. As quadratic costs functions imply a linear marginal supply
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Figure 3.3: Panel A depicts Forward premium ∆p as a function of large-scale
intermittent capacity K and distributed prosumer capacity C in percentage of total
demand. Panel B shows the forward premium contour plot.
curve, only the variance of spot prices is relevant and influences the forward premium
negatively with increasing uncertainty. Panel B indicates that the opposite takes places
for cubic cost functions (a = 3), as increasing demand correlates positively to the
forward premium. As risk related hedging pressure of high-cost producers becomes less
important in (3.8) compared to (3.6), the last risk related hedging factor representing
retailer procurement risk becomes the dominant risk factor. The simulation therefore
indicates that the effect of increasing demand levels varies between off-peak and peak
hours throughout the day.
3.3.2 Renewable Technology and Information Asymmetries
The main focus of this paper is the relation of large-scale and distributed intermittent
capacity on forward and spot pricing. Figure 3.2 shows the effect of demand on
the forward premium in relation to these two sources of uncertainty. An interesting
observation is that in both panel A and panel B the effect of demand, as discussed in
the previous paragraph, is amplified with increasing large-scale intermittent capacity
K and distributed prosumer intermittent capacity C. The intuition is that both factors
amplify spot price uncertainty and thus increase the dominance of the respective risk
related hedging pressures of producers and retailers.
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To investigate the implications of the model with respect to variations in both
sources of intermittent production, we conduct simulations for the quadratic cost model
with only variations in large-scale intermittent production K and distributed prosumer
intermittent production C. The simulation results displayed in Figure 3.3 show that
the model implies that the forward premium increases with increasing prosumer
intermittent capacity C, indicating dominant retailer risk related hedging pressure.
Contrarily, the forward premium decreases with increasing large-scale intermittent
capacityK, indicating dominant producer risk related hedging pressure. The sensitivity
of the premium to large-scale intermittent capacity is largest when prosumer capacity
is little, reaches a tipping point and may even increase with high share of prosumer
capacity.
The intuition behind the simulation result is that large-scale intermittent capacity
mainly relates to producer risk related hedging pressure, thus negatively influencing
the forward risk premium. This in contrast to distributed prosumer intermittent
capacity, mainly relating to retailer risk related hedging pressure and thus positively
influencing the forward risk premium. We therefore find a non-neutrality of renewable
technologies in their effect on forward and spot pricing. Note that in the simulations
σ2K = σ
2
C for equal shares of intermittent production sources K and C. Information
asymmetries caused by the ability to gather and predict information of producers and
retailers would therefore amplify the indicated effects further.
3.3.3 Propositions
We form a set of propositions based upon our model and insights from the simulations
on the role of renewable technology and information asymmetries. We further relate
technological factors to fundamental and dynamic price drivers. Specifically the
following propositions are addressed.
The non-neutrality of renewable intermittent production technologies.
Intermittent production sources are non-dispatchable or non-flexible sources with
variable and uncertain production profiles. Although not all renewable power sources
are non-dispatchable, hydropower for example can adjust its production based upon
reservoir levels, most renewable energy sources are intermittent and dependent on
factors that cannot be controlled, for example the weather. We focus on the main
intermittent renewable energy sources that contribute to decarbonizing global power
grids: wind and solar.
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• Solar. The global solar power market has steadily grown as costs for photo-
voltaic panels have dropped over the past decade, with currently over 300GW
solar capacity installed world wide. Growth rates are still increasing, driven
by improvements in production processes and efficiency gains through new cell
designs. Solar power projects can largely be categorized into two main groups;
utility-scale and distributed production. The underlying technology for both is
different. Large-scale solar power makes use of solar collectors to heat a power
steam turbine and generate a large capacity output. Alongside smaller issues
like water management and land use, such projects are capital intensive, and
involve large risks for financial institutions. An increase in large-scale solar
power installations is expected to negatively influence the forward risk premium.
In most developed countries distributed solar power is therefore the dominant
technology. Policy schemes have caused residential rooftop PV power to surge,
spreading capacity over the country and reducing end-consumer demand. As
consumers only need a smart meter to plug feed their individual solar cells in
to the grid, information on production profiles is not transparent for retailers.
Thus an increase in distributed solar power is expected to positively influence
the forward risk premium.
• Onshore wind. Wind turbine technology has evolved substantially during the
past decade and onshore wind energy is regarded one of the most mature renew-
able energy technologies with relatively low costs, with global capacity reaching
500GW globally. With turbine manufacturers offering a range of turbines, with
increasing competitiveness driven with corresponding increasing hub-heights,
blade lengths and output capacity, onshore wind capacity has drastically in-
creased in various parts of the world. With national political-motivated subsidies
decreasing and constraints in terms of large geological interesting space, the
highest growth rates are achieved for smaller scale distributed wind farms. These
production facilities are typically connected to the distribution grid, changing
visualization and asset management as flows are registered by network operators
as negative demand. Moreover, output prediction is outlined by extrapolation,
rather than exact metering, as operators are not able to exactly monitor what
is going on behind the meter. This lack of information transparency means
that an increase of onshore wind production is expected to positively or nega-
tively impact the forward risk premium, depending respectively on the share of
distributed versus large-scale production units.
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• Offshore wind. Although still a less mature technology, offshore wind energy
is advancing at a rapid pace. Increased investments, falling costs and new
technologies, with turbines and blades growing ever larger make it possible to
achieve high generation capacity per unit. Cumulative offshore capacity has
risen to over 15GW, primarily installed in Northwestern Europe. Due to the
availability of good wind resources offshore, steady wind and less turbulence,
these wind farms reach the highest nominal capacity for renewable power
farms. Offshore wind farms are however characterized by long lead times, as
construction is more complex and high grid connection costs. This makes that
offshore farms are typically owned by large incumbent utility companies, often
back by state-funded subsidies. The first subsidy-free offshore wind farm was
however recently contracted in the Netherlands and many other countries are
expected to follow (Crooks, 2018). This ownership structure makes that asset
information is largely transparent and the intermittent character is expected
to mainly influence hedging and strategic decisions on the producer side of the
wholesale market. Thus an increase of offshore wind production is expected to
negatively influence the forward risk premium.
Fundamentals. Fundamental drivers of power prices are demand, marginal costs
of high-cost producers and scarcity (Bunn, 2004). As controlling for scarcity would
require privacy sensitive data from power plants revealing scheduled capacity levels,
we focus on the former two; demand and marginal costs.
• Demand. Varying demand for power between peak and off-peak hours leads to
price variations throughout the day. Related to risk preferences of producers and
retailers in our model, the effect of demand is negative with linear increasing
marginal costs but becomes positive for convex cost functions. As demand
forecasts of end-consumers are published with an hourly frequency and the level
of convexity of the supply curve varies through the day, i.e. peak versus off-peak
hours, it is expected that the time of the day influences the sign of the premium.
• Marginal costs. The underlying fuel costs of the technology running on the
margin is a fundamental power price driver. Gas-fired power stations often form
the marginal technology, as albeit flexible, these power stations are typically
more costly in terms of maintenance and fuel costs. As gas-fired power plants
typically determine the merit order, even when other technologies like renewable
energy sources form a substantial part of the supply curve, we use (daily)
day-ahead gas spot prices as a proxy for the marginal cost of production. An
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increase of the gas price means that the supply curve moves up and hence we
expect a positive effect on the premium.
Behavioral and Dynamic effects. Risk assessment of market participants is
subject to adaptive behavior to market price dynamics (Redl and Bunn, 2013). We
therefore consider market agents to derive information about future price distributions
by observing recent price developments. Specifically we consider the variance of spot
prices and the basis to be two main behavioral price drivers.
• Variance. Variance is a measure for spot price risk, and clearly affects risk
preferences of producers and retailers in our model. Previous literature has
presented mixed findings with respect to the influence of variance on the
premium, as both positive (Redl and Bunn, 2013) and negative (Longstaff and
Wang, 2004) relations have been reported. We include the variance as backward-
looking measure, i.e. a proxy for expectations on spot price distributions by
computing a weighted average over the 7 previous days for the same respective
hour.
• Basis. The basis is defined as the forward price minus the weekly average of
spot realizations for the same respective hour. We assume that recent spot
realizations serve as proxies for agents’ anticipations on actual spot realizations
and thus contains reliable information on future change of the spot price. In-
deed, market participants’ risk assessment techniques consider ongoing market
dynamics and expectations adapt to recent price developments. Although not
specifically addressed in our analytic model, the basis therefore forms an impor-
tant parameter in the formation of expectations on forward and spot prices in
power markets (Bunn and Chen, 2013). We hypothesize that the basis positively
influences the forward premium.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
Based upon the analytic model and the derived propositions, we analyze the effects
of production technologies on the forward premium via a comprehensive approach.
We propose the following model:
pt,Tf − pTs = α+ βiXti + t,T (3.9)
Where the dependent variable represents the ex-post forward premium, with pt,Tf
the forward price per MWh of a contract that is quoted at time t, for the delivery
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in period T , and pTs the price on the spot market for real time delivery in period T .
Note that we consider the ex-post premium to be a valid estimator of the ex-ante
premium in our model, assuming a relatively small normally distributed random error
on the difference between both. Xti include all the exogenous variables discussed in
our propositional framework. Although extensive multi-factor models with several
exogenous variables raise concerns of overfitting, each non-technical variable has been
motivated by previous analytic and empirical specifications. Note that all exogenous
variables are quoted at time t, meaning we use day-ahead prediction forecasts on
generation levels for wind and solar, day-ahead gas spot prices and day-ahead forecasts
on demand variations. Behavioral price drivers like the variance of spot prices and
the basis were estimated observing the moments of past distributions. Thus, with all
information available to producers and retailers prior to market bidding and price
setting, the variables can be considered non-endogenous.
3.4.1 Californian and British Power Market Data
We estimate the empirical model in equation (3.9) using market data from the
Californian and the British power market for a time span of 3 years, from 2015 to
2018. Liberalized power markets have globally experienced a sharp increase of an
array of intermittent renewable production sources in recent years, mainly politically
motivated to achieve sustainability targets. With variations in national and regional
policies, the implementation of various renewable technologies is however taking
place in different forms and paces. As a result, we collected market data from
two competitive liberalized power markets that have not only experienced a sharp
increase of renewable energy generation, but also show variation in type of renewable
technologies. Figure 3.4 visualizes the yearly net generation in GWh per renewable
technology type, respectively for California and the United Kingdom. To put these
numbers in perspective, power generation of wind and solar sources summed up to
19.6 % and 29.4 % of total power demand for respectively California (292 TWh) and
the United Kingdom (336 TWh).
Small-scale solar plants are generally considered plants with up to 5MW in
generation capacity, although this remains rather generic. Where in California the
majority of small-scale solar generation is installed in the form of smaller solar farms
between 1 and 5 MW, as installations below 5MW are offered more favorable feed-in
tariffs, about 60% of small-scale solar in the United Kingdom comes from residential
rooftop installations, as end-consumers enjoyed relatively high subsidies for generating
their own distributed capacity. Note that this difference has a major impact on the
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Figure 3.4: Net generation in GWh of intermittent renewable energy sources, by
type, 2015-2017. Data from EIA (2018) for California and Department for Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy (2018) for UK.
ability of market agents to predict and gather information, as retailers have much
less transparency on what is going on behind the meter. We therefore consider solar
power to mainly affect producer risk preferences in California, related to an increase
of large-scale intermittent production sources in our model. Contrarily, solar power
is expected to predominantly affect retailer risk in the United Kingdom, related to
distributed prosumer capacity. In terms of wind specifications, onshore and offshore
wind net wind generations are in the same order of magnitude for the United Kingdom,
although average onshore wind turbine capacities are well below those of offshore
wind. We only consider onshore wind levels in California, as currently hardly any
offshore wind turbines are installed.
For California, data is obtained from the Californian Independent System Oper-
ator (ISO) open access same-time information system (CAISO, 2018). Day-ahead
predictions on wind and solar generation, as well as load are available for all trading
hubs within the California power market area. As the majority of renewable energy
sources are placed in the Southern trading hub, we focus on this area. Hourly forward
(day-ahead) and 5-minute spot (real-time) prices are available via Locational Marginal
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Figure 3.5: Average hourly forward price and premium [USD/MWh] between day-
ahead and real-time price in California, 2015-2017. Data from CAISO (2018).
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Figure 3.6: Average hourly forward price and premium [GBP/MWh] between day-
ahead and imbalance price in the United Kingdom, 2015-2017. Data from ENTSO-E
(2018).
Price (LMP) levels and are aggregated across the respective trading hub on an hourly
basis. Finally, hourly Henry Hub gas spot prices are used, as only limited financial
arbitrage between the hub and California is taking place and gas power plants are
the marginal production type in California (Brown and Yu¨cel, 2008).
We collect data on the British power market from the ENTSO-E Transparency
platform (ENTSO-E (2018)). Wind and solar day-ahead predictions are provided
by the Transmission System Operator (TSO) with an hourly frequency. Note that
the reported data by the TSO is not based on exact metering for each utility but
rather via extrapolations from specific metered utilities in combination with weather
data. Hourly forward (day-ahead) and half-hourly spot (imbalance) price data, as
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well as corresponding day-ahead predictions of the load are reported by the TSO
and aggregated on an hourly basis. Finally, with gas power plants operating most of
the time on the margin in the UK, hourly NBP gas spot prices serve as a proxy for
marginal costs.
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 depict the average hourly forward price and variance of hourly
realized ex-post premia for respectively California and the United Kingdom over the
entire data set. The illustrations nicely visualize typical daily power price profiles,
with the highest prices when demand is peaking just before midday and another peak
in the evening. The effect is more pronounced for California, creating the so-called
duck curve as relatively high shares of solar generation cause prices to drop in the
afternoon hours. We observe the premium pt,Tf − pTs to fluctuate around zero, with
larger variations in the evening hours and more spread out for California. Note
that average power prices are considerably higher in the United Kingdom than in
California.
3.4.2 Results
We use OLS regression to estimate equation (3.9) and test coefficients with the
Newey-West covariance matrix to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
In general, regression results support our multi-factor propositional framework in
terms of coefficient sign and statistical significance. In the following, we first discuss
the results for each market separately before comparing the effect of renewable
technologies and information asymmetries between both markets.
Results for California are given in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Adjusted R2 statistics
suggest a good fit particularly just before noon. The sign of the solar coefficient
is significantly negative throughout the day. We thus find evidence that day-ahead
predictions on solar generation levels predominantly affect producer risk, with installed
large-scale solar capacity is an order of magnitude larger than small-scale solar. The
effect is less obvious for onshore wind, as the installed wind capacity is relatively low
and turbines vary in size.
Results for the United Kingdom are given in Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. The adjusted
R2 statistics generally suggest a good fit for the whole day, but particularly in the
afternoon. Although we find offshore wind to correlate with onshore wind prediction
levels (η = 0.7), the relation of offshore wind is found to be significantly negative for
more hours when both are presented separately and thus does not raise concerns of
multicollinearity. We observe offshore wind to influence risk related hedging pressure
of producers, with a significant negative sign throughout the day. Solar generally
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present positive coefficients. With small-scale solar in the same order of magnitude
as large-scale solar, the result suggests that σ2K < σ
2
C , creating higher uncertainties
for retailers than for producers, as retailers do not exactly know what is taking place
behind the meter.
In terms of other specifications, we first find the basis to be one of the main
explanatory variables for both markets. This relates to agents’ concerns on market
power and price peaks causing behavioral adaption (Bunn and Chen, 2013). In line
with expectation, we find the effect to be stronger for peak hours than off-peak
hours. Second, gas prices generally indicate a positive effect, especially in the United
Kingdom where gas power plants are most often the marginal producer. In California,
off-peak premia relate more to fuel prices than during peak hours, potentially linked
to the exercise of market power (Borenstein et al., 2008). Third, the effect of load
is generally positive. In line with our model, hourly differences occur as the effect is
larger for peak hours. Finally, we find evidence for the forward premium to negatively
correlate to the variance of spot prices. The effect decreases during peak hours, when
volatile shocks may create highly skewed prices (Redl and Bunn, 2013).
3.5 Conclusions
With the growing share of sustainable energy sources, electricity markets experience
increasing uncertainty and volatility. The realization of the forward premium is affected
by producers and retailers’ respective market understanding, information asymmetries
and corresponding risk preferences. In this work, we find a technology-varying risk
premium in sequential short-term power markets, related to environmental information
asymmetries between renewable technologies on both sides of the market.
We find evidence for large-scale and distributed renewable energy technologies to
oppositely affect the forward premium, as asymmetries arise in the ability to predict
and gather information on renewable production schedules. The technology-varying
forward premium reveals a balance of behavior and risk preferences among producers
and retailers. In markets that are predominantly characterized by large-scale renewable
production facilities, day-ahead predictions on high levels of renewable energy will
negatively influence the premium as the risk related hedging pressure of producers
increases. In markets with high shares of distributed ’rooftop’ renewable capacity on
the other hand, positive day-ahead predictions on renewable energy production will
positively influence the premium, as hedging needs of retailers increase.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the Market Equilibrium
Spot Market
We derive optimal spot positions for Nh high-cost and Nz zero-cost producers, by
solving the equilibrium game with backward induction. The profit maximization
problem of producer i is given by:
max Πi =
[
pfFi + psQi − c(Fi +Qi)
]
(A1)
The first-order-condition gives us the optimal quantity for high-cost producer i:
∀i ∈ H;Q∗i = a−1
√
ps
a.ei
− Fi (A2)
Zero-cost producers need to sell the realized capacity Ki in the spot market. The
spot market position Qi is determined when the forward market position Fi is given:
∀i ∈ Z;Q∗i = Ki − Fi (A3)
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Inserting equations (A2) and (A3) in the following market clearing condition∑
i∈H Fi +
∑
i∈H Qi +
∑
i∈Z Ki = D − C renders the following optimal spot price,
which is text equation (3.3):
p∗s =
(D − C −∑i∈Z Ki)a−1[∑
i∈H(
1
a.ei
)
1
a−1
]a−1 (A4)
Forward Market
At time 1, consumer demand uncertainty D, prosumer distributed production uncer-
tainty C, and low-cost production capacity Ki are random variables. We assume that
producers and retailers are risk-averse and use a mean-variance utility function, with
µi = µj = µ the risk-averse coefficient:
maxFiU(Πi) = maxFi
[
E(Πi)− µiVar(Πi)
]
(A5)
We next focus on the derivation for high-cost producers 2. Inserting (3.2) in (A1)
renders:
∀i ∈ H; Πi = pfFi − p∗sFi −Gi +
(
a
−1
a−1 − a −aa−1
)
p
∗ aa−1
s e
−1
a−1
i (A6)
With Var(Πi) = E(Π
2
i )− E2(Πi) and using properties of variance and covariance,
we obtain for a = 2:
∀i ∈ H;U(Πi) = pfFi − E(p∗s)Fi −Gi +
1
4ei
E(p∗2s )− µiVar(p∗s)F 2i
−µi 1
16e2i
Var(p∗2s ) + µi
Cov(p∗2s , p
∗
s)Fi
2ei
(A7)
We obtain optimal forward positions Fi by taking the first-order-condition:
∀i ∈ H;Fi = pf − E(p
∗
s)
2µiVar(p∗s)
+
1
4ei
Cov(p∗2s , p
∗
s)
Var(p∗s)
(A8)
A similar process yields the optimal forward position for high-cost producers with
a = 3:
∀i ∈ H;Fi = pf − E(p
∗
s)
2µiVar(p∗s)
+
2
3
√
3ei
Cov(p∗1.5s , p
∗
s)
Var(p∗s)
(A9)
2A similar simplified derivation can be followed for zero-cost producers, as the cost term in (A1)
becomes irrelevant.
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Similarly, and independent of a, optimal forward positions for zero-cost producers
and retailers can be found:
∀i ∈ Z;Fi = pf − E(p
∗
s)
2µiVar(p∗s)
+
Cov(p∗sKi, p
∗
s)
Var(p∗s)
(A10)
Fj =
pf − E(p∗s)
2µjVar(p∗s)
+ pc
Cov(Dj − Cj , p∗s)
Var(p∗s)
− Cov((Dj − Cj)p
∗
s, p
∗
s)
Var(p∗s)
(A11)
Finally the forward market clearing condition
∑Nh
i=1 Fi +
∑Nz
i=1 Fi +
∑M
j=1 Fj = 0
renders the optimal forward price for the quadratic model in text equation (3.6) and
for the cubic model in text equation (3.8).

Chapter 4
Decision Strategies and
Forward Pricing with
Increasing Intermittent
Supply 1
4.1 Introduction
Power markets go through a series of radical transformations to achieve sustainability
and liberalization targets, influencing decision making, trading strategies and price
formation. The integration of renewable power introduces more low marginal costs
suppliers to the market, as no fuels are needed to produce electricity and resulting
decreasing power prices may significantly affect trading strategies and policy structures
(Zhou et al., 2015). On the other hand, intermittent supply from wind mills and
solar panels in combination with the non-storability of electricity and price inelastic
1This paper is currently under review at a top-ranked journal and parts of the chapter appear in
the following publications and peer reviewed conference proceedings:
Koolen, D., Huisman, R., and Ketter, W. (2018). Strategic trading and hedging in sequential
electricity markets with increasing renewable supply. IAEE Energy Forum, 27(1), 37-38.
Koolen, D., Huisman, R. and Ketter, W. (2017). The Electricity Forward Price with Increasing
Intermittent Supply. 2017 International Conference on Energy Finance. Hangzhou, China (25-27
May 2017).
Koolen, D., Huisman, R. and Ketter, W. (2016). Risk and Decision Making for Electricity Forward
Markets with Volatile Resources. 2016 Annual Meeting of the Commodity & Energy Markets
Association (CEMA). Paris, France (23-24 June 2016).
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demand cause spot prices to fluctuate heavily. Increased competition, lower prices and
more price volatility have drastically changed decision behavior in electricity markets.
There exists extensive literature on the decision-making process in power markets,
from the perspective of producers, retailers and consumers (Conejo et al., 2010). In this
paper, we focus on decision making in forward and spot markets. Decisions are affected
by uncertainty and risk, due to price fluctuations and spikes, intermittent production
and volatile demand profiles. As agents can make more accurate predictions when time
moves closer to delivery, producers and retailers face more uncertainty about volumes
to deliver and spot prices when the delivery date is further away in time. This creates
a demand for forward contracts, committing the producer to deliver an agreed amount
of energy for a fixed price at a specific point in time in the future. Pricing forward
contracts, however, is tedious and several theories have been put forward to explain
differences between forward and (ex-ante) spot contracts, also called the forward
premium. First, power agents engage in hedging activities to avoid risk exposure over
supply and demand spot uncertainties. The forward premium as such reflects the net
cost of hedging against short-term risks and may vary depending on individual needs
for mitigating risks of producers and retailers (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002),
time granularity (Longstaff and Wang, 2004) and vertical disintegration of traditional
power suppliers (Aı¨d et al., 2011). Second, in oligopolistic markets, producers may
take strategic positions in forward contracts. Allaz and Vila (1993) indicate that
the existence of a forward market creates incentives for strategic commitments in
forward markets, as it allows them to gain market share in the spot market. From this
perspective forward markets may divide the market power of suppliers over forward
and spot markets and thereby enhance total efficiency, although for power markets
this has been subject to debate with respect to buyer market power (Anderson and
Hu, 2008) and capacity constraints (Murphy and Smeers, 2010). No conclusive view
on modeling forward price behavior has however been put forward yet, and both
theories have presented their shortcomings with respect to empirical validations in
power markets.
Previous empirical work on price formation of electricity forward contracts has
shown various findings with no clear economic interpretations. Lucia and Schwartz
(2002) find expectations over spot prices to consist out of two components; an
equilibrium long-term spot price and a mean-reverting short-term price, and hence
vary over time in size and sign. They successfully find empirical evidence for the model
using data from the Scandinavian NordPool market. Further studies have suggested
the emergence of positive ex-post risk premia, with forward prices higher than realized
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spot prices for example, for the German EEX market (Wilkens and Wimschulte, 2007)
and the NordPool market (Botterud et al., 2010). Others find evidence for negative
forward premia, for example Cartea and Villaplana (2008) indicate backwardation
in the Nordic, British and PJM market. Longstaff and Wang (2004) relate time-
varying premia to specific trading hours during the day for the PJM market, whereas
Borenstein et al. (2002) find similar results for the Californina market, related to
market inefficiencies and market power. Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) study
forward and spot price formation in electricity markets via an equilibrium approach
and find mixed evidence for the Californian power market. They demonstrate that the
forward risk premium depends on measures of demand uncertainty. Although they do
not focus on supply uncertainty, their result shows clearly that the difference between
forward and expected spot prices is a direct result of volume uncertainty. Summarizing,
the sign and size of the forward premium is found to depend on market structure
characteristics and demand, supply and price uncertainty. This paper contributes to
this literature examining the forward risk premium in relation with uncertainty faced
from an increasing market share of intermittent renewable power supply.
The economics of wind and solar power are so different from conventional power
that it motivates us to study the impact that the penetration of such power sources
has on decision making and prices in wholesale electricity markets. Indeed, operational
constraints and the underlying technological cost structures of heterogeneous power
agents may significantly affect individual bidding behavior in sequential markets
(Hortacsu and Puller, 2008). Building on the rationales of hedging and strategic
behavior, the production technology mix is found to influence forward and spot
price formation in oligopolistic markets (Peura and Bunn, 2016) and supply function
market equilibria (Al-Gwaiz et al., 2016). In terms of empirical specifications, previous
work has confirmed the view that decision making and forward pricing depend on
operational market characteristics and underlying production technologies, but mixed
results have been presented with respect to trading decisions and (sign of the) forward
premium (Bunn and Chen, 2013). Redl and Bunn (2013) indicate the impact on the
forward price in the German EEX market of underlying fuel fundamentals. Huisman
and Kilic (2012) discuss that significant differences may occur depending on the
specific market. They find evidence for different time-varying risk premiums between
the Nordpool market, with storage in the form of hydropower, and the Dutch APX
market, primarily operating gas-fired power plants. This had also led to the believe that
one cannot apply the same model to all markets, as specific theoretical assumptions
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on hedging, strategic behavior but also operational constraints and technology need
careful market specific attention.
Our paper is about the impact of a technology change on the strategic behavior of
agents in forward and spot markets and on respective prices. We research this in an
experimental set-up as we think that this adds valuable insights related to theoretical
studies, as we can allow for more variation, and empirical studies as we can rule out
other effects than a change in renewable supply alone. Experiments have proven to
be a promising method to analyze financial markets and individual trading behavior
(Bloomfield et al., 2009; Brown and Kim, 2013), as well as testing theories related to
forward trading and market competition (Le Coq and Orzen, 2006). In the context
of electricity markets, experimental methods have been used to investigate market
design changes (Bower and Bunn, 2000), explain system behavior (Koritarov, 2004)
and analyze the effects of introducing forward trading (Brandts et al., 2008). Indeed,
Ketter et al. (2016b) show that experimental modeling and agent-based simulation
studies are not only an effective way to spur innovation, but also provide a flexible way
to analyze decision making and price formation under various real-world conditions
and test the efficacy of both analytic and strategic research ideas. The experimental
design allows us to implement variations with a high degree of control and test decision
making in sequential markets with a varying production technology mix under ceteris
paribus conditions. As such, we are able to focus exclusively on individual decision
making behavior, strategies of intermittent and non-intermittent producers and the
price formation process in power markets with increasing intermittent supply.
We contribute to the emerging discussion on the efficient integration of renewable
energy sources in current power systems (Cramton and Ockenfels, 2012; Ko¨k et al.,
2016). Considering an increasing market share of intermittent power sources, we find
that non-intermittent power producers can retain their profits by shifting their focus
towards the spot market, affecting price behavior and the premium priced in forward
contracts. We find evidence for this strategic effect, evaluating price dynamics under
varying market shares of intermittent renewable energy in German spot markets.
As this strategic pricing effect of non-intermittent producers is often not desirable
from a sustainable market point of view, the work ultimately paves the way for
policy makers to examine the implications on existing market structures and their
participants’ strategic space, considering alternative market designs both from market
and individual perspective in order to not only integrate large shares of renewable
energy in existing electricity markets, but also achieve it in a sustainable manner.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss the experimental
approach and discuss the market structure from an agent and market perspective,
before elaborating on the experimental design. We next analyze the results from the
experimental sessions, both from a market and decision making perspective, and
relate implications of increasing intermittent renewable market capacity on pricing
and decisions to the operational characteristics of power agents. We conclude by
evaluating our findings empirically in German short-term power markets and discuss
the contributions and implications from a market and individual perspective.
4.2 Approach
In this paper, we focus on how market agents make decisions and retain profits
in forward and spot markets in light of technology change that yields operational
constraints and uncertainty. Power markets wherein supply came predominantly from
fuel based power plants now face a growing market share of renewable producers
which burn no fuels to produce power. The inclusion of intermittent renewable power
supply changes the economics of power markets. First, renewable suppliers have no
fuel costs and therefore lower marginal costs of production than (traditional) fuel
burning suppliers have. In competitive forward markets renewable producers undercut
prices of fuel based producers because of lower marginal costs and, as a consequence,
drive them out of the forward market. Secondly however, renewable sources reduce
power system flexibility as their supply is intermittent depending on wind and solar
radiation. Traditional fuel based supply is non-intermittent and therefore offers volume
adjustment flexibility that renewable supply does not have. This leads to an advantage
in spot markets, as they can more flexibly adjust their production volumes in real-time
than intermittent renewable supply.
Figure 4.1 depicts price formation in power forward and spot markets, with risk
neutral heterogeneous producers. The merit order curve is formed by the array of
different production technologies such as renewable power, nuclear, coal, gas and
peaking units forming the supply curve S. Forward demand is represented by the
demand curve Q, which may be approached as inelastic (Knaut and Paulus, 2017).
Following Borenstein et al. (2008), the forward price equals the expected spot price
with transparent information, as market participants agree upon a price taking into
account expected demand and supply in the spot market. Deviations in real time are
dealt with in the spot market, resolving any mismatches between demand and supply
in real time. Figure 4.1 indicates the volatile behavior of spot markets, as uncertainties
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium forward and spot pricing along the merit order of production
technologies.
on demand and supply cause spot prices to fluctuate around their expected value.
Where in expectation the deviations have an expected value of zero, oversupply of
intermittent renewables R+ cause the spot price to drop to p−, where a shortage R−
would cause the spot price p+ to be larger than its expected value. We argue that
non-intermittent producers can profit from changing their focus from forward to spot
markets in order to exploit their flexibility advantage in spot markets.
With respect to the terminology, classic financial decision literature defines a spot
market as the market when the transaction is carried out in the same period at which
the decision is made (Mulvey and Vladimirou, 1992). In this study, we consider the
spot market to be such a short-term financial market. We define the forward2 market
as the place where agents trade contracts for delivery of power during future periods
of time ranging from one day to several years ahead. One example is the day-ahead
market where one-day forward contract are traded for next day delivery. Although
energy economics literature tends to refer to the day-ahead market as a spot market as
well, we define the day-ahead market as a forward market as the distinction between
future and real-time delivery is of crucial importance in this paper.
We examine strategic bidding and forward price behavior with the increase of
intermittent production sources in a developed experimental trading environment.
2For this paper, there is no need to focus on the differences between futures and forward contracts.
Therefore we actually refer to both forward and futures contracts when we mention a forward contract
in this paper.
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The economic environment of the experiment takes into account two sets of producer
agents: intermittent and non-intermittent producers. In general, agents buy and sell
electricity contracts during two periods. In period 1, they trade a forward contract
that delivers power in period 2. In period 2, they trade in the spot market after which
delivery takes place.
4.2.1 The Agents
The first type of agent (labeled consumer) is an automatized power consumer that
demands a volume D of power for delivery in period 2. Although modeled as a single
entity, this agent represents a group of power retail companies that deliver power to
households and enterprises. Typically, their demand is price in-elastic in the short run,
meaning that the consumer agent purchases the demand in the market whatever the
price is (price taker). Short run inelastic demand is a typical assumption for stylized
short-run electricity market models. Indeed, studies examining short run markets find
no significant demand elasticity (Lijesen, 2007) or only little during specific hours
(Knaut and Paschmann, 2017). This behavior occurs due to energy retail companies
hedging their margins with forward contracts as they typically sell power to their
clients against fixed prices. We assume that consumer’s demand is uncertain, but that
the probability function of demand is publicly known with mean D and variance σ2D.
The second agent (labeled intermittent producer or ip) supplies power from
intermittent power sources such as wind mills or solar panels during period 2. His
supply is uncertain, depending on for instance wind speed or solar radiation. Following
the work of Ito and Reguant (2016), renewable producers have zero marginal costs
but are uncertain about their production realization. We assume that the supply of
the intermittent producer is normally distributed with mean Pip and variance σ
2
ip. All
intermittent agents have the same production technology, with the same probability
structure, and that their supply is mutually independent in order to simulate an entire
market rather than a specific region. We further assume that this agent does not
curtail its power supply as many countries have policies and regulation to incentivize
this type of production3. We define nip, a treatment variable in the experiment, as
the number of intermittent producers in the market.
3This applies to supply from subsidized renewable energy that has been integrated over the past
decennia, guaranteeing renewable producers a fixed price per unit of electricity produced. The most
commonly used mechanism to establish this is via feed-in tariffs, which may lead to market inefficient
investment in the technology mix (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). Moreover, the loss of curtailing this
type of generation is generally perceived as an unacceptable solution (Jacobsen and Schro¨der, 2012).
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The third agent (labeled non-intermittent producer or nip) supplies (non-
intermittent) power with a production capacity during delivery of Pnip. It converts
a storable commodity in the form of chemical energy into electrical energy and can
determine the amount of delivered power flexibly. We assume that non-intermittent
suppliers can do so with unlimited flexibility or ramping, i.e. production volumes
can be varied freely between 0 and Pnip. Fuel and emissions right costs are given
by a variable cost efficiency parameter ηnip, implying the fact that production costs
increase with output. We assume no other variable costs. Fixed costs are assumed zero,
representing a sunk cost and not affecting the decision-making process (Pindyck, 1993).
For simplicity, we assume all non-intermittent producers to have the same production
cost function, where we abstract from supply issues like faults or maintenance. We
define nnip, a treatment variable in the experiment, as the number of non-intermittent
producers present in the market.
The fourth agent (labeled operator) is an automatized market and system
operator. The market operator collects all bids and offers and calculates the market
clearing price. As soon as the actual demand and supply from the intermittent agents
is revealed in period 2, this agent determines the additional amount of electricity to
be purchased or sold in the spot market to balance demand and supply. As such, the
market operator is a price taker.
In all sessions, we keep the total number of producers fixed, but vary the number
of intermittent and non-intermittent producers such that we can examine the impact
of the market share of each producer type. Market information like the number of
intermittent and non-intermittent agents, cost structures and operating constraints of
individual power suppliers are transparent to all market participants.
4.2.2 The Power Market and Time Periods
Trading electricity in wholesale markets can be done in different sequential markets.
Where forward contracts commit a seller to deliver and a buyer to receive power for
a price that is agreed upon before delivery, spot markets on the other hand serve
to deal with any remaining imbalances of market agents at real time, as a perfect
match between supply and demand is required to ensure grid stability. Care needs to
be taken with respect to the terminology in published literature to the spot market.
Electricity spot markets are typically referred to as day-ahead markets, for delivery of
electricity during the period of 1 hour in the next day, or intraday markets, trading
15-minute products for the next day. Classic financial decision literature however
defines a spot market as the market when the transaction is carried out in the same
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period at which the decision is made (Mulvey and Vladimirou, 1992). In this study,
we consider the spot market to be such a short-term financial market. Indeed, in
the context of electricity markets with increasing uncertainty, risk-sharing becomes
more important and short-term financial instruments close to real-time, like intraday
and continuous trading, gain liquidity (Knaut and Paschmann, 2017). Any remaining
imbalances in real-time are solved on imbalance markets, through activation of services
that are procured beforehand via the reserve market typically by flexible producers,
and settled accordingly.
All (intermittent and non-intermittent) suppliers produce one homogeneous com-
modity, electricity. Produced power is sold in hourly contracts in two sequential stages,
the forward and the spot market for physical delivery immediately after clearance of
the second market.
During period 1, a forward contract is traded. The forward contract guarantees
the supply of 1 entity of power in the unit MWh, in period 2 at a fixed price. All types
of producers, both intermittent and non-intermittent, can submit a limit offer price
and volume; i.e. they submit the minimum price against which they are willing to sell
the submitted number of forward contracts. We limit intermittent producers forward
trading to 115% of their nominal capacity, in line with existing policies preventing
speculative behavior of inflexible power plants (Morales et al., 2010). Moreover, since
the main purpose is electricity trading with physically binding contracts rather than
financial arbitrage in energy markets (Knaut and Paschmann, 2017), we prevent all
producers from purchasing forward contracts.
The automized consumer agent is price-taking when purchasing the expected
demand for period 2 in the forward market. As we consider short-term sequential
markets in this study, the market clearing volume equals the expected demand D
from the consumer agent. After receiving the limit offers from the producers, the
market clearing forward price is set at that price where the total supply of forwards
equals the expected consumer demand. Once cleared, the forward market price is
transparent to all producers and portfolio positions remaining for the spot market
are updated.
During period 2, a spot contract is traded. Non-intermittent producers can submit
both limit bid and offer prices; i.e. a maximum price against which they are willing to
purchase power and a minimum price against they are willing to sell power. Following
Knaut and Paschmann (2017), real-time markets allow only for restricted possibility of
trading as market operators require assurance of supply in short-term markets. Thus
although supply of intermittent power producers is incentivized, they are price-taking
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in the spot market. Once all bids and offers are submitted in period 2, realized
consumer demand and intermittent production capacity become transparent to all
producers in the market. At this point in time, the operator determines the volume
needed to balance demand and supply and clears the spot market thereby setting
the market clearing price. This set-up is consistent with most European imbalance
markets, where power producers submit their bids and offers for specific time during
the day. The system operator purchases and sells power respectively in the case of
power shortage or oversupply. Therefore, at maximum 1 of the 2 limit orders of the
non-intermittent producer is cleared in the spot market.
4.3 The Experimental Design
The goal of the study is to examine via a clean experimental market set-up the
effects of an increase of the market share of intermittent power suppliers to volumes,
bidding strategies, prices, and profits. We distinguish between three market structures:
1. The non-intermittent market (NI) is a market with only non-intermittent
agents. The number of intermittent producers is 0% and the number of non-
intermittent producers is 100%. We use this treatment as a base scenario,
representing a traditional market without intermittent renewable energy supply
capacity.
2. The low market share intermittent market (LI) is a market with both
intermittent and non-intermittent producers. The market share of intermittent
capacity is one third of the total capacity stalled in the market, the rest are
non-intermittent producers. This represents a market in which renewable supply
capacity is lower than conventional power supply capacity.
3. The high market share intermittent (HI) is a market with both intermittent
and non-intermittent producers. The share of intermittent and non-intermittent
producers is inverted compared with the LI market, representing a market that
is dominated by renewable supply capacity. The share of intermittent capacity is
two thirds of the total capacity stalled in the market, the remaining production
capacity in the market is given by non-intermittent producers.
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In order to control for ecological validity, exogenous variables defined above are
set to approximate real world values4. The number of all (intermittent and non-
intermittent) power producers is set to n = nip + nnip = 15, as power markets
typically consist out of few dominant firms representing most of the market share (Ito
and Reguant, 2016). The consumer agent’s demand follows a normalized distribution
with D ≈ N(11500, 1150), which is in the same order of magnitude to that of a
small country like the Netherlands, or large metropolitan area like New York. We set
the maximum capacity of non-intermittent producers to Pnip = 900 MW, nominal
capacity of intermittent producers to Pip = 900 MW and their deviation to σip to
5%. Variable costs of non-intermittent producers are set to ηnip = 50 euro/MWh. We
allow minimum bidding prices of -300 euro/MWh and maximum bidding prices of
3,000 euro/MWh5.
We conducted a total of 5 laboratory experiments. A single experiment consisted
out of 3 sessions for each market structure, with a session being a continuous period of
time where a fixed group is exposed to a single experimental treatment. Each session
consisted of 30 rounds, where each round represented a sequential auction with a
forward and spot market. The 3 market structures or treatments were presented in a
counterbalanced order over the set of 5 experiments.
Before the start of an experimental session, participants were randomly assigned
a producer role, being either an intermittent or non-intermittent producer. For the
LI and HI treatment this procedure was repeated two more times to ensure that
every subject participated in the three market structures as both intermittent and
non-intermittent producers for an equal amount of rounds. In order to control for
learning in the initial rounds, data was only collected from the rounds where market
clearing prices converged and remained within a margin of 25 percent of the average
over the previous 5 rounds. For all 5 experiments, convergence was achieved within 5
learning-sessions, resulting in data of 25 rounds for every market structure in every
experiment.
We acknowledge that participating in the experiment requires extensive knowledge
on energy finance and market design as subjects have to play different types of
producers, submitting bid and offer prices, understand the probability structure of
demand and intermittent supply and keep track of their results. Subjects were therefore
4We note that the absolute numbers in the experiment are of little importance, arbitrarily
depending on the number of market participants, market technologies and production costs. Rather
the results of the experiment are illustrative for relative performance of market prices in relation to
the decision making behavior of intermittent and non-intermittent producers.
5To our best knowledge, all power markets apply minimum and maximum prices. The limits
that we apply are in accordance with Dutch power markets.
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recruited among graduate students that specialize in energy finance and management,
with a different set of 15 market participants selected for every experiment. Subjects
were provided instructions (in appendix) via e-mail before the experiment and these
instructions were read aloud before the experiment. No communication between
subjects was allowed and each experiment lasted about 1 hour. Participants were
paid proportionally with performance, i.e. depending on their final financial position
after participating in all 3 market structures and begin assigned to every producer
role an equal amount of time. Cash was the only incentive offered, with an average
of 25 euro. A computerized program, written in JAVA, was used to implement the
experimental environment and is openly accessible via the web.
4.4 Results
We first analyze the outcomes of the experiments by analyzing market performance in
terms of allocated volumes on forward and spot markets for both types of producers.
Next, we elaborate on individual decision making and bidding, allowing us to study
whether non-intermittent producers can retain their profits with a high market share
of intermittent producers.
4.4.1 Allocated Volumes
Table 4.1 shows the allocated volumes in the forward and spot market for intermittent
producers, for the two treatment set-ups where intermittent producers are active.
In the first experiment of the LI market, intermittent producers sell on average 892
MWh forward (median 900 MWh). They sell 5 MWh on average on the spot market
(median 4 MWh), however when looking at absolute numbers they sell or buy on
average 55 MWh. This indicates the balancing behavior of the spot market, where
both shortage and oversupply imbalances are settled in order to ensure market and
grid stability. Indeed, over all the experiments of the LI market, the intermittent
producers sell almost all of their expected output (900 MWh) on the forward market.
Spot market trade is characterized by dealing with variations between realized and
expected volume. We observe the same behavior in the HI market, with a larger share
of intermittent producers active. This is in line with expectation, where intermittent
producers move as close to real time in order to follow more accurate production
predictions, but restricted participation in the real-time spot markets prevents them
from strategic behavior.
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Although the average and median allocated volumes do not differ between the
LI and HI markets, we observe differences between the LI and HI standard errors
for the forward market in Table 4.1. In all experiments, the standard error of the
allocated volumes is higher in the HI market than in the LI market. We attribute
the higher dispersion of allocated volumes in the HI market to the increased market
share of intermittent producers. Some intermittent producers seem to deviate from
the nominal bidding procedure and are allocated only very low volumes as indicated
by the column representing minimum values for the HI market. This is mainly due to
high bidding prices, which result in the risk of not being cleared in the market.
Table 4.2 shows the allocated volumes of non-intermittent producers. In the first
experiment, producers sell 750 MWh on average (median 890 MWh) in the forward
market. They purchase on average 20 MWh (median 0 MWh) in the spot market,
however absolutely speaking we find that on average 56 MWh is bought or sold.
Moving from market NI via LI to HI, we clearly observe a decreasing pattern in the
allocated conventional volumes in the forward market. The higher the market share of
intermittent producers, the lower the volumes allocated to non-intermittent producers.
This is in line with the negative effect of intermittent producers on electricity prices up
to a day-ahead level as low marginal cost producers replace conventional production
capacity (Sensfuß et al., 2008). The opposite pattern is apparent in the spot market as
it becomes more liquid from NI to HI. The null-values for minimum allocated volumes
in the forward market and median allocated volumes in the spot market indicate that
some bids of the non-intermittent producers however do not get cleared.
We observe that standard errors are higher than those of intermittent producers,
indicating more risk-seeking behavior. Moreover, larger standard errors are observed
with increasing intermittent market share, both for the forward and the spot market.
This indicates a larger discrepancy in sequential decision making between individual
non-intermittent producers. The view that we obtain from this table is that a non-
intermittent producer sells less on the forward market and more on the spot market
when the share of intermittent producers increase.
4.4.2 Strategic Decision Making Non-intermittent Producers
Non-intermittent producers (are forced to) move from the forward market to the
spot market when the share of intermittent producers increases. In other words,
conventional power producers trade less on the forward market and more on the spot
market when the production capacity of renewable energy sources increases. This
results in more uncertainty in the profits and losses of non-intermittent power plants,
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however not necessarily in reduced profits since non-intermittent producers determine
prices in the spot market whereas intermittent producers are price takers, obliged
to trade away remaining imbalances resulting from variation in realized production
volumes.
Table 4.3 presents the average profits of non-intermittent producers for the different
experiments. In the first experiment, average profits of non-intermittent producers
were 16758 euro in the forward market (median 18900 euro), 1949 euro in the spot
market (median 0 euro) and 18707 euro in total (median 19800 euro). We find evidence
for the merit order effect in the forward market, resulting in lower profits and the
subsequent market push-out of conventional power plants. Non-intermittent producers
however do seem to gain from trading in the spot market, with higher profits made
with more intermittent sources on the market. This indicates that there is a demand
for flexible spot production with more intermittent production in the market, i.e. a
convenience yield for flexibility in the producer’s portfolio. Moreover, Table 4.3 shows
null median values in the spot market for NI and LI but positive median values for
HI, indicating that most non-intermittent producers are profitable in the HT spot
market. Some non-intermittent producers even only profit from trading in the spot
market as maximum total profit values for HI are equal to maximum spot profits in
some cases.
We find that the well-known merit order effect is only dominant in the NI to
LI market with low share of intermittent production. The increase in spot market
profits seems to be the dominant factor moving from LI to HI, when there is a
significant market share of intermittent producers. To verify, we run a multilevel
mixed-model extension of the Mann-Whitney test, allowing to test for differences
between the three market set-ups while taking into account the nested group structure.
Z-scores are reported in Table 4.3, calculated by comparing ranks between treatment
levels, while p-values are obtained by comparing the Z-score against a distribution
of Z-scores calculated by bootstrapping ranks with no treatment interference. We
find that with increasing intermittent market share, forward profits decrease and spot
profits increase significantly, and as a result total profits significantly decrease from
NI to LI and significantly increase again from LI to HI. Interestingly however, no
significant differences were found in total profits between the NI and HI market for
non-intermittent producers. This indicates a strategic move from non-intermittent
producers, moving from the forward market to the spot market, exploiting the
convenience yield for flexibility.
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The shift in strategic sequential market decision making of non-intermittent
producers is interesting to observe from a bidding perspective in the forward market.
Table 4.4 shows the bidding volumes and prices of non-intermittent producers in the
forward market. In the first experiment, non-intermittent producers offered to sell on
average 870 MWh (median 900 MWh) against an average price of 66 euro per MWh
(median 67 euro per MWh). We find that non-intermittent producers are willing to
sell against lower prices on average in the forward market, approaching the marginal
production cost of 50 euro per MWh in the HI market. Minimum prices even fall
below marginal production costs for some producers.
The standard error of the bidding volumes increases from NI to HI, indicating that
possibly not all producers follow the same strategy. We define this form of disagreement
as the mean of the individual producers’ variances, resembling on average how different
the strategies are of the individual non-intermittent producers. Indeed, highest levels
of disagreement are found for the HI market, with some producers clearly bidding
forward volumes around half of their capacity (450 MWh), while others remain
risk-averse and mainly try to hedge against uncertainties in the spot market.
To conclude, we observe that non-intermittent producers try to strategically enter
the spot market, even at the risk of making a loss in the forward market. Thus, our
experiments show that non-intermittent producers are not only pushed out of the
market due to the merit order effect, they also strategically decide themselves to bid
lower volumes in the forward market, as they expect they can profit from changing
their focus from forward to spot markets in order to exploit their flexibility advantage.
4.5 Forward and Spot Price Dynamics in Relation
to Supply Uncertainty
We next focus whether the shift in focus of non-intermittent producers from forward to
spot markets affects forward and spot price dynamics and therefore also the behavior
of the forward premium. Table 4.5 provides summary statistics of market clearing
prices in the forward and spot market. We observe a decline in forward prices for
power markets with more intermittent capacity, related to the merit order effect.
Clearly, spot prices become more volatile from NI to HI. The range of spot prices
increases, with a clear decline in minimum prices and even reaching negative values
for HI. The well-known positive skewness of power spot prices seems to disappear for
markets with more intermittent production, in line with recent empirical results from
the German spot market (Gianfreda and Bunn, 2018). Realized forward premiums
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experience large variations over rounds and markets. As a result from the merit-order
effect, the forward risk premium seems to drop from NI to LI. The change in the
forward premium is however less clear from LI to HI, where the above described
strategic effects seems to play a role.
Figure 4.2 visualizes bidding price density distributions of non-intermittent pro-
ducers in forward and spot markets for all market treatments. The plot indicates
that across all experiments, bidding prices shift to the left in the forward market
from NI to HI, as producers try to remain competitive. This leads to more similar
distributions in the HI forward market across experiments, indicating smaller margins
for strategic bidding in this market. Bidding price density distributions in the spot
market appear to present a bimodal distributions, which can be explained by the fact
that producers need to bid two prices; one for selling power and one for buying back
power. The bimodal behavior in spot price distributions is confirmed by a Hartigans
dip test. We further observe bidding spot prices to be more volatile with increasing
market share of intermittent producers. Although it is line with expectation that
cleared spot price would be more volatile with more intermittent market capacity, as
expected imbalances would increase, we argue that a similar trend for bidding prices
in the spot market indicates strategic behavior.
Summarizing, we find that with a increasing market share of intermittent renewable
energy producers, non-intermittent producers are able to retain their profits by moving
their focus from the forward to the spot market. In order to do so, non-intermittent
producers bid lower volumes against lower prices in the forward market, in order
to have in expectation higher profitable positions in the spot market. This is in
accordance with Allaz and Vila (1993), who show that in oligopolistic market settings,
strategic producers engage in forward trading in order to gain spot market share. We
however also observe that, apparently irrespective of the realized demand for power
in the spot market, non-intermittent producers strategically enlarge the difference
between spot prices for buying back power and selling extra power. Non-intermittent
producers thus have market power to strategically make use of their convenience yield
for flexibility in the spot market. As most non-intermittent producers in current power
markets burn fossil fuels to produce power, our findings imply that it is important
for renewable policies to adequately evaluate the product flexibility, in relation to
achieving a sustainable increase of intermittent renewable energy sources in wholesale
power markets.
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Figure 4.2: Bidding prices of non-intermittent producers in non intermittent market
(NI), low intermittent market (LI) and high intermittent market (HI) for the (A)
forward market and (B) spot market.
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Figure 4.3: Boxplots of German forward (day-ahead) and spot (real-time) prices
[EUR/MWh] for the 10% least windy days (Low wind) and the 10% most windy days
(High wind) in 2017. Data from ENTSO-E (2018).
4.5.1 Empirical Validation in German Short-term Power Mar-
kets
We validate the above experimental findings empirically, using data from short-term
sequential day-ahead and real-time power markets in Germany. German power markets
provide us an ideal setting to study the effect of intermittent renewable energy sources
on power pricing, as the main reference in European power markets with a recent
sharp increase in the market share of solar and wind power. With the outspoken
objective to achieve a share of renewable energy in power production of 35% by 2020
and 80% by 2050, Germany’s renewable energy share has boosted through massive
subsidies. With rapid expansions in wind and photo voltaic power, intermittent supply
creates increasing uncertainties in German short-term markets.
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We collect data on forward (day-ahead) predictions on wind generation and spot
prices in the German control area in 20176. Figure 4.3 illustrates the intuition on
the effects of technology and renewables on German forward and spot trading. The
figure depicts forward (day-ahead) and spot (imbalance) prices for the predicted 10%
least and the 10% most windy days in 2017. Note the different scale for both markets,
indicating higher spot price volatility in general. The merit order effect is observed
in the forward market, as prices drop on more windy days. The decreasing pattern
is less clear for the spot market, as prices are more scattered in both the positive
and negative direction. The simple illustration nicely demonstrates the impact of
intermittent production sources on price formation in short-term electricity forward
and spot markets. In the following, we examine whether we can find empirical evidence
in German spot markets for the strategic effect indicated by the experimental sessions.
In order to find evidence for this effect, we estimate the effect of forward (day-ahead)
wind prediction levels on the ex-post forward premium, using the following Two-Stage
Least Squares regression:
pt,Tf − pTs = αv + β1Windt,T + β2VolT + β3Gast + β4Margint + T (4.1)
Where the term on the left-hand side resembles the realized forward premium,
pt,Tf is the forward price at time t for delivery in T and p
T
s is the spot price at delivery.
We control for fundamental price drives like fuels costs of non-intermittent producers,
using day-ahead NCG gas spot prices, and the reserve margin, which is modeled as
the ratio of generation over production at t (Redl and Bunn, 2013). All predictive
variables are day-ahead predictions, with the natural exception of actual realized
imbalance volumes, and thus closely relate to our experimental design by controlling
for any information gains between forward market closing and spot market decision
making.
6We represent the spot price by the reBAP imbalance price, which incorporates the price for
activating secondary and tertiary imbalance reserves close to real-time. The price presents some
further interesting characteristics that motivates the reBAP price as a good representation for the
spot price. First, the reBAP price is symmetric per time interval, i.e. the same price is applied
for both positive and negative imbalances. This is similar to our experiment, where irrespective of
the individual imbalance, the cleared spot price is the same for all market participants. Second,
European imbalance markets are in general regulated markets, where the auction design differs
slightly per region and country. The reBAP price is one of the only imbalance prices partially based
upon (energy) bids that are made day-ahead. As we make use of day-ahead predictions levels for
wind generation, this feature is particularly interesting with regards to our experimental set-up as
no additional information on generation levels is available to market participants on the spot market.
As a consequence, prediction accuracy between the forward and spot market does not change and
hence does not affect the results.
4.5 Forward and Spot Price Dynamics in Relation to Supply Uncertainty 97
The main variables of interest are Windt,T representing the predicted volume of
wind production at t for delivery in T and VolT , which is the spot demand for power
or imbalance volume at T . As suggested by the experiment, a higher market share
of intermittent production leads to strategic behavior of non-intermittent producers
and subsequently higher absolute forward premiums. In order to illustrate this effect
in other words, consider two respective days A and B in a power market where
wind generation is responsible for a substantial part of the supply curve. Day-ahead
predictions for day A indicate wind mills produce at maximum capacity, whereas it
is predicted to be windstill on day B: WindAt > Wind
B
t . Consider now on the day
itself an equal positive spot demand (imbalance) in hour 1 for both days and an equal
negative spot demand for hour 2: VolA1T = Vol
B1
T = −VolA2T = −VolB2T . In that case,
the indicated strategic behavior of non-intermittent power producers would lead for
comparing day A to day B to a more negative premium in hour 1 and a more positive
premium in hour 2, or also:
∣∣∣pAf − pAs ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣pBf − pBs ∣∣∣.
We estimate the model with log-transformed price differences as the impact of the
explanatory variables on the electricity prices is likely to be non-linear (Mulder and
Scholtens, 2013). Our main interest is to find evidence for the indicated (strategic)
bimodal effect of intermittent production on spot prices. We therefore split the data
and analyze the effects separately for positive and negative imbalances. Note that spot
prices in general tend to be higher(lower) than forward prices for positive(negative)
imbalances, resulting in a negative(positive) forward premium in order to compensate
for ramping-up(ramping-down) capacity. We remove the about 10 % of the data where
this was not the case and log-transform the absolute value of the premium in order to
compare results between positive and negative imbalances. The estimates for equation
(4.1) are given in Table 4.6.
Results largely follow our expectation. Absolute positive and negative imbalances
naturally create a larger demand for spot balancing, thus positively influencing the
absolute forward premium. Controlling for the actual imbalance, we find evidence
for the positive effect of day-ahead wind predictions on the absolute premium. Thus,
when high shares of intermittent production are predicted day-ahead, non-intermittent
producers seem to bid more negative spot prices to balance negative demand and
more positive spot prices for positive imbalances. In other words, irrespective of
the actual spot demand to balance the market, high day-ahead predictions on wind
generation will result in more extreme spot prices. This is in line with the intuition
of the experimental results, where non-intermittent producers engage in strategic
behavior with high share of intermittent production.
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Table 4.6: Regression results on absolute premium for positive and negative spot
market volumes, Germany 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: log
∣∣∣pt,Tf − pTs ∣∣∣
Positive Imbalance Negative Imbalance
(1) (2)
|VolT | .10−3 0.27∗∗∗ 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Windt .10
−6 7.19∗∗∗ 4.16∗∗∗
(1.25) (1.18)
Gast 0.18
∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗
(0.003) (0.008)
Margint 0.19 0.93
∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.11)
Constant -0.13 2.83∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.13)
Observations 18,397 10,705
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.12
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we study decision making and price formation in short-term forward
and spot power markets with increasing supply uncertainty via an experimental
approach. The developed trading environment allows us to isolate the effects of volume
uncertainty via three market structures representing a non-intermittent market, low
intermittent market share and high intermittent market share. It is well-known that
with increasing intermittent capacity, non-intermittent producers are pushed out
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of the forward market as they have higher costs to produce power. We observe
however an alternative explanation, as bidding volumes of non-intermittent producers
decrease as well. This indicates that non-intermittent producers bid strategically in
power markets with increasing intermittent capacity to obtain profitable spot market
positions, capitalizing their convenience yield for flexibility.
The results indicate how behavior and decisions of power agents can significantly
differ with changing technology and operational market constraints. We find the
notions of hedging pressure and strategic behavior to depend on the market share
of intermittent production as well as vary according the preferences and beliefs of
individual power agents. As such, the present study constitutes a first step in using
experiments to investigate the impact of increasing supply uncertainties on established
rationales for forward trading. Further experiments could be helpful in understanding
a number of related issues, disentangling strategic behavior (Murphy and Smeers,
2010), hedging (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002) and convergence bidding (Li
et al., 2015). As mixed empirical results have been found for these rationales when
applied to markets operating under different operational constraints, experiments
could investigate the desired variations with a high degree of control.
Analyzing these systems, relationships between market participants, technology
adaption and changes to market behavior provide key ingredients for devising a robust
well-functioning electricity market, its design and its governing policies. We find that
producer technologies affect commodity trading and thereby affect market prices,
often not desirable from a sustainable efficient market point of view. This work paves
the way for policy makers to examine the implications on existing market structures
and their participants’ strategic space, considering alternative market designs both
from market and individual perspective in order to not only integrate large shares of
renewable energy in existing electricity markets but also achieve it in a sustainable
manner.
Appendix
A Instructions of the Portfolio Management Game
Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making in energy wholesale
markets. The instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully and make appropriate
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decisions, you can make a substantial amount of money. Your earnings will be paid
to you in euro at the end of the experiment. In the experiment we use the (virtual)
euro as well. The average amount of earnings is put on 20 euro, this can go up to 50
euro if you make appropriate decisions.
In this experiment, you will participate in a market as a producer of the fictitious
commodity electricity and exchange it on the wholesale market. The end consumers,
or demand side, of the market are simulated. All participants will represent a different
producer type and you will be every producer type at least once. It is important that
you remain silent and do not communicate with other people while the experiment
is running. Do not log in before the experimenter tells you to log in. This is very
important because if you log-in at another time, you might end up with a wrong
portfolio. You can register to the game by going to http://xlarge.rsm.nl/hedging_
game2/faces/register. Use your student number as your user name. Passwords can
be chosen freely. If for some reason you lose connection to the internet or the game play
does not automatically load, do not refresh the page! You can log-in again by using your
log in credentials at http://xlarge.rsm.nl/hedging_game2/faces/login.xhtml.
If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please indicate this to the
experimenter and he will come to you. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
Please make sure you go through the full documentation. It will help you signifi-
cantly in getting higher earnings. The clarification of the gameplay will be written in
italic. Reading this should help you to understand the basic gameplay. We will use
numerical examples in the instructions. These are only meant to be an illustration
and are irrelevant for the experiment itself. The experiment consists of 3*30 differ-
ent rounds with each 2 decision periods, a forward and a spot market. The whole
experiment will take about 90 minutes. You will represent one player in every market
setting. After 10 or 20 rounds, your player (or producer) type may be switched. The
experimenter will announce at the beginning of each period that a new period has
begun. If for some reason your screen does not update automatically, please go to the
address bar and press enter. Do not press F5 to refresh as this might introduce errors!
An example is used to explain the basic game play, written throughout this docu-
ment in italic. You can log-in to this example by going to http: // xlarge. rsm. nl/
hedging_ game2/ faces/ login. xhtml . The example consists out of a market of 6
players with Username: 1 to 6. and respectively the same Password. Thus, for logging
in to player 1, submit ’1’ in the Username and Password field. In this way, you can
log in to all 6 players and look at their playing and bidding strategy. You will find the
game is currently in round 5. By going to the Bids tab, you can find all the previous
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Figure A1: Overview game tab example.
bids of the respective player. Unless mentioned otherwise we will use player 1 in the
explanation. An overview of this player his game tab is found in Figure A1.
Market Setting
When you log-in, you will be automatically directed to the ’game’ tab of the game. In
this tab you get an overview of what your portfolio looks like under my plants. Market
information will be presented to you (shown in light green), indicating how the supply
side of the market is established. The remaining fields in this tab show the financial
102 Decision Strategies and Forward Pricing with Increasing Intermittent Supply
overview of your activities in the market and are discussed below. Next, there is a
tab called ’bids’, giving you an overview of your bid history and the cleared market
results in all previous rounds and a tab ’info’ where general background information
on the portfolio management game can be found. The different tabs are shown in
black in Figure A1.
At the beginning of the game you can see the producer type of your personal
portfolio in the game tab under my plants. During each period, you can sell units of
the fictitious commodity. If you sell a unit you will have to incur that unit’s production
cost (though these are zero for some production types), this info can be found under
cost info.
Player 1 his portfolio consists out of 1 wind plant with an expected output of 2500
MWh and a standard deviation of 125 MWh. In this round his actual output was 2503
MWh. Further you can find under market info that the market consists out of 3 wind
plants with the same characteristics and 3 gas plants with a maximum output of 2500
MWh and a marginal cost of 50 euro/MWh.
Market
This field shows you the properties of the demand side of the market. Expected
demand and the standard deviation are given at the beginning of each period to
give an indication of expected demand. This is depending on historical data and the
current market profile. Once the period is closed, the actual demand and the cleared
market price are filled in.
Player 1 is currently at the end of round 5. The demand in the forward market
is 10.000 MWh and a clearing price of 60 euro/MWh was established. In the spot
market expected demand was 0, but due to a standard deviation of 500 on this expected
demand, an actual demand of 1095 was observed. A clearing price of 65 euro/MWh
was found.
Market Bidding
Under market bidding, you will have to place your bids for which volume and price
you would like to sell or buy electricity. Each period you will have to make decisions on
the offer price and the offer volume for the commodity. The two decisions periods are
called the forward and the spot market, explained further below. Each bid represents
an offer to sell or buy the fictitious good on the wholesale market. Depending on the
market demand and the bids of the other players in the game, you will see whether
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your bid got executed or not after each period. It may happen that a bid only gets
partially executed. If your bid gets executed, then you will make a revenue which can
be consulted under Financial Position in the ’game’ tab.
Player 1 made a bid to sell 2500 MWh for a price of 60 euro/MWh in the forward
market. He was forced to sell his remaining position of 3 MWh in the spot market,
this will be explained further below.
Rounds and Periods
Each round of the experiment consists of 2 subsequent periods: the forward market
and the spot market. Both markets get cleared via a uniform pricing auction.
Forward Market
When the forward market is open, the market bidding fields below forward market
will appear in white, meaning that you can now place your bids in the forward market.
All producer types can participate. In the forward market you can only sell electricity.
This can be done for positive and negative prices. Make sure that once your bids are
placed, you hit enter or click on the save button in the upper right corner to submit
them to the market. Once every player has done this, the market gets cleared and the
spot market is opened. You can then consult whether your personal bid got executed
or not.
By going to the ’bids’ tab, you get an overview of the bidding history. For player 1
you can see the last 5 playing rounds. Player 1 his bid always got fully cleared, except
for round 2. Here only a part got cleared (1556 MWh of 2600 MWh), due to his higher
bidding price which was also the marginal clearing price.
Spot Market
When this market is open the fields below spot market will appear in white, meaning
that you are allowed to place bids in the spot market. You can make two bids here,
one to sell electricity in the spot market and one to buy back electricity in the spot
market. Only one market gets cleared, depending on the market demand which is
set after closure of the market. In the spot market ’sell’ you can sell your remaining
position and in the spot market ’buy’ you can decide to buy back electricity that you
sold in the forward market. For renewable producers these fields are already filled in,
as they cannot make any bids in the spot market. Make sure that once your bids are
placed, you click on the save button in the upper right corner to submit them to the
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market. Once every player has done this, the market is closed and cleared. You will
be able to see whether your bid got executed and consult the cash position.
For the understanding of the spot market, log-in to player 4 and go to the bids tab
to get an overview of his bids. In round 2, player 4 sold 2000 MWh in the forward
market. He thus decides to sell his remaining of 500 MWh for a price of 60 euro/MWh
or buy back his sold 2000 MWh for a price of 40 euro/MWh, depending on the total
market demand. After submitting his bids and closure of the market, it was found that
there was an oversupply in the market, therefore the spot ’buy’ market gets cleared
and player 4 sells 65 MWh.
Producer Types
There are 2 different producer types with differing properties:
• Renewable producers. These power plants produce electricity based upon a
renewable energy resource. This makes these sources intermittent as no perfect
predictions can be made of weather forecasts. Therefore an expected output
with standard deviation is given. You can bid up to 115% of the expected output
in the forward market. Actual output of your power plants is shown once the
spot market is opened. Remaining positions are automatically dealt with by the
game. You will therefore not be able anymore to make bids in the spot market.
• Conventional producers. These power plants produce electricity based upon a
fossil fuel, which can be seen as a non-sustainable resource. Utilities have to buy
in the primary energy resource and indicated by the marginal cost price field.
These power plants are however much more flexible in producing electricity
and are only limited by their maximum output capacity. Once scheduled in the
forward market, power plants are allowed to still deviate from this position in
the spot market.
Player 4 has a gas plant, thus being a conventional producer. He can sell up to
his maximum output in the forward and spot market but is not obliged to do this. In
round 2, player 4 decides to only sell 2000 MWh of his 2500 maximum output in the
forward market. In this way, he can sell the reminder of 500 MWh in the spot market
sell or buy back 2000 MWh in the spot market buy. In case the player sells everything
or nothing in the forward market, the player will only be able to make a bid in one of
both spot markets. This is the case for player 6 in round 2 (Did not sell in forward
market so cannot buy anything back).
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Financial Position
The financial position can be found at the end of the page of the ’game’ tab and
in the ’bid’ tab for previous rounds. These can be split up into different parts for
each period and are shown per power plant and in total. Your earnings in euro’s will
depend on the total profit you make over the different rounds. Some further player
rationales are discussed in the example. Good luck!
To get an overview of the bidding strategy of player 1, go to his bid tab. In Round 1,
player 1 bids 2200 MWh for a price of 48 euro/MWh. He knows that the conventional
producers have a cost price of 50 euro, so he expects his bid will get cleared as it is
likely that they will bid higher. The clearing price is 58 euro and he sells his total
bid, generating a revenue of 127.600 euro. In the spot market he has a remaining
position of 545 MWh which he has to sell. Market demand is negative however in the
spot market (case of oversupply) and cleared spot price is 45 euro, thus generating a
loss of 24.525 euro in the spot market. Next, observe how player 1 differs his bidding
behavior over the next couple of rounds and compare it to player 2 and 3 which are
also wind producers. The strategy renewable producers try to pursue is to not have
a remaining portfolio in the spot market. This is because if they produce more than
expected, they could have sold this for a higher price in the forward market and if they
produce less than expected they will have to buy in expensive energy. Driving the bid
price up in the forward market may thus end up generating a loss in the spot market.
To get an overview of the bidding strategy of player 4, go to his bid tab. In Round
2, Player 4 his bid of 2000 MWh gets cleared for a price of 58 euro/MWh. He thus
generates a revenue of 116.000 euro but has a cost of 100.000 euro for buying in the
gas, leaving him with a revenue of 16.000 euro. It is logical that the conventional
producer will always place a bid with a price higher than his marginal cost price for
producing. In the spot market player 4 has to make two decisions. The player is willing
to sell his remaining position of 500 MWh, but only for a higher price as he knows he
is only bidding against other conventional power plants. His bid on the buy side of the
spot market is to buy back his sold quantity of the forward market. He will do this
for a lower price than his marginal cost price in order to generate an extra profit, in
this case 40 euro. The buy side of the market gets cleared and player 4 makes a profit
of 650 euro. The strategy conventional producers follow is to not sell everything in
the forward market and make a profit by selling for higher prices or by buying back
for lower prices in the spot market. In order to make a profit, the bid price in spot
sell will thus always be higher than the marginal cost price, bid prices in the spot buy
market will always be lower.

Chapter 5
Conclusions
With the ongoing decarbonization, it is key for markets to provide adequate price
signals for assets and investments in order to ensure an efficient and sustainable energy
transition. In this dissertation, we have investigated the influence of an increasing
market share of intermittent renewable energy resource on sequential pricing in
short-term power markets. We find the increasing share of intermittent renewable
energy sources to present some pronounced challenges for producers and retailers,
decentralized prosumers, network operators, financial traders and power systems
and markets as a whole. To summarize, the three chapters make the following main
contributions in relation to an increasing market share of intermittent renewables in
short-term sequential power markets:
[1] identify a technology-varying forward premium in relation to risk preferences of
heterogeneous producers and retailers and evaluate its non-monotonic behavior
in terms of demand uncertainty and (flexible) trading opportunities (Chapter 2).
[2] propose a multi-factor model incorporating various renewable technologies and
provide empirical evidence for the effect of resulting information asymmetries
between market participants on short-term sequential pricing (Chapter 3).
[3] indicate a convenience yield for flexibility in a developed experimental trading envi-
ronment and empirically evaluate strategic bidding of non-intermittent producers
in spot markets (Chapter 4).
Table 1.1 puts these contributions into context in terms of the main differences
between the chapters.
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5.1 Discussion
Power markets transitioned from a regulated to a market-based paradigm, with
the liberalization of the power sector in the beginning of this century. The process
transformed traditional monopolies with very few stakeholders to an industry where
generators enter new business fields and final customers can source their own elec-
tricity. Moreover, public concerns about the negative environmental effects of using
conventional carbon-intensive power sources to generate electricity have globally moti-
vated policies to support the increase of renewable energy sources that are inherently
variable and uncertain. Consequently, power markets face unprecedented challenges
that require a thorough understanding of market mechanisms and pricing in order to
achieve productive and allocative market efficiency.
In this dissertation, we study the effect of intermittent renewable energy sources
on trading behavior and price formation in short-term sequential markets. Forward
markets provide information about future prices and may improve the efficiency of
the final allocation for commodities facing uncertainty on future prices or volumes
(Ito and Reguant, 2016). Price differences between forward and spot prices have
primarily been explained to reflect risk preferences of producers and retailers with
the forward premium corresponding to the net hedging cost of all market agents
(Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002). Strategic behavior (Allaz and Vila, 1993) and
trading inefficiencies (Borenstein et al., 2008) have further been indicated to play a
role, although for power markets this has been subject to debate with respect to buyer
market power (Anderson and Hu, 2008) and capacity constraints (Murphy and Smeers,
2010). No conclusive view on modeling forward price behavior has however been put
forward yet, and both theories have presented their shortcomings with respect to
empirical validations. Mixed empirical evidence for these rationales across markets
and maturities has put forward the role of technology and operational characteristics
in analyzing forward and spot price formation (Bunn and Chen, 2013; Huisman and
Kilic, 2012).
With the ongoing decarbonization of production sources in global power markets,
in this dissertation we address via a multi-method approach the role of heterogeneous
production technologies and intermittent renewable power in short-term sequential
power markets. The first five propositions attached to this dissertation indicate how
the different chapters relate to the notions of risk preferences and decision strategies
in short-term sequential power markets. In chapter 2, we analyze risk related hedging
behavior of producers and retailers in markets with an increasing share of intermittent
capacity via an equilibrium model. We observe a tipping point in the forward risk
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premium with increasing intermittent market capacity, reflecting variations in indi-
vidual risk preferences. Chapter 3 builds on this work, empirically validating market
participants’ risk related behavior with both large-scale and distributed renewable
energy sources. The more comprehensive experimental approach in chapter 4 allows
to implement variations with a high degree of control and test decision making in
sequential markets with a varying production technology mix. The results from the
experimental trading platform show evidence for strategic behavior of non-intermittent
producers and a convenience yield for flexibility in power markets with an increasing
share of renewable energy.
Our work relates to two major streams within the management science literature.
First, there is an emerging stream of work on sustainable Operations Management
(OM), studying the relationship between operational drivers on the one hand and
profitability, people and the planet on the other hand, linked to the triple bottom
line reporting (Kleindorfer et al., 2005). With operational and financial interactions
clearly linked in the decision making of the firm (Birge, 2014), sustainable OM plays
a crucial role in delivering solutions for sustainability and enabling production and
supply chains to operate more efficiently with respect to their environmental and
social impact. In this dissertation, we relate to the key active themes as identified
by Drake and Spinler (2013), by addressing the role of production technology and
information asymmetries in efficient sustainable supply chains. Besides addressing
differences between production technologies their environmental performance, it
implies considerations between sustainable production technologies and their impact
on sequential market efficiency.
Second, the field of Green Information Systems (IS) also applies sustainability
notions by action levels, being individual, organization and societal (Watson et al.,
2010). Green IS can be seen as a wicked problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973), bridging
research and ideas from many fields, by having an impact through innovative use
of IS in transportation, energy, manufacturing, buildings and elsewhere (Dedrick,
2010). Sustainable transformations in energy systems are seen as such complex
transitions (Ketter et al., 2016a), where issues involve a plethora of different dimensions,
from market, commercial and financial to environmental and political issues. In this
work, we approach one of the core questions of Green IS, finding the association
between information systems and supply chain performance from an efficiency and
environmental perspective (Melville, 2010; Loock et al., 2013). We address these
issues in relation to environmental transparency, as the specific nature of supply
and demand uncertainties may cause asymmetries between market agents’ ability
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to gather and predict information. Furthermore, we contribute to the economics of
IS focusing on pricing structures of low-cost goods. IS literature typically focuses
on digital product settings, as with the growth of the internet, pricing structures
changed for information and other digital goods, such as cable television, digital
music and news and journal articles, where goods are modeled as information goods
with zero marginal cost (Hitt and Chen, 2005). Note that IS artifacts for pricing low
marginal goods in most digital industries are self-sustaining. This is at odds with
power markets, ensuring grid stability and security of supply by requiring availability
and flexibility, therefore necessarily involving various technological products.
The influence of electricity on our society is undeniably widespread, being closely
related to issues on national security, economic and sustainable development, and
environmental awareness. This complex of issues makes the world faces one of its
biggest challenges ever in meeting the needs for sustainable and reliable energy. The
future of the energy sector will, to a large extent, be formed transformation in the
power sector. With the electrification of heating and transport, large scale integration
of renewable energy sources and increased overall energy efficiency associated with new
appliance standards and more industrial technologies powered by electricity, markets
are in a state of uncertainty and flux. The work ultimately engages policymakers
to adequately evaluate the implications of intermittent renewable energy sources on
existing power market structures and their participants’ strategic space. Considering
alternative market structures from both market and individual perspectives, it allows
to devise key ingredients for well-functioning sustainable power markets, its design
and governing policies.
5.2 Summary of Main Findings and Implications
In this section, we briefly revisit the main findings and implications of the individual
chapters in this dissertation, discuss limitations and provide an outlook for future
research.
5.2.1 Main Findings Chapter 2
In Chapter 2, we study how an increasing market share of intermittent renewable
energy sources affects risk preferences of producers and retailers in forward markets via
a general equilibrium approach. Where sequential markets help with efficient allocation
of resources for commodities facing market uncertainty, operational constraints affect
producers’ ability to trade and hence cause different market behavior from producers
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with different production technologies. We analyze how market conditions define risk
behavior of heterogeneous market participants and influence the ability of forward
prices to predict spot prices.
Combining analytic modeling and numerical simulations, we find evidence for
non-monotonic behavior of the forward premium in relation to increasing intermittent
market capacity, driven by varying risk-related hedging pressure of producers and
retailers. Depending on the systematic risk and the net hedging pressure of all market
participants, we find the risk premium to vary and reach a tipping point along the
increasing share of intermittent market capacity. We further explore the technology-
varying risk premium in relation to power demand and find evidence for hourly
varying fluctuations of the forward premium, oppositely affected by the level of wind
penetration and demand. Lastly, we analyze the notion of flexible arbitrage in the
form of cooperatives and speculative trading, and give evidence for a first-mover
advantage to integrate flexible assets in the portfolio.
Influenced by market conditions as flexibility, producer set up and risk aversion,
relative performance of spot and forward markets is bound by the markets’ operational
constraints. We find that the various operational characteristics of producer technolo-
gies affect trading behavior and thereby affect market prices, often undesirable from
a sustainable efficient market point of view. It is key for policy makers to adequately
evaluate the need for flexibility in renewable power markets, in order to motivate the
increase of renewable energy source in a sustainable manner.
5.2.1.1 Limitations and Future Work Chapter 2
Weron (2014) discusses in his review on electricity price forecasting models a set
of limitations of equilibrium and multi-agent models. Although such models offer
valuable insights in understanding price formation and overall market behavior, they
have limitations in the way in which the competition between market participants
can be represented, especially with regards to short-term volatility. Indeed, where
most literature considers equilibrium in expectations and risk aversion, notions on
strategic behavior and convergence bidding are often left out or modeled under specific
assumptions. Although our primary focus is on the relation between heterogeneous
production technologies and risk aversion among market players, market specific
implications require further specifications and assumptions in order to price formations
and behavior on a more granular level.
A central theme in addressing the effect of renewable power on efficient market
functioning is to identify metrics and the needs for flexibility. Although, our model
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is simplified with no curtailment of intermittent supply or market power, we believe
the main insights on forward price behavior are robust to such extensions. Another
avenue for future research may be to explore the role of non-convexities in the supply
curve (Paschmann, 2017), as well as the notion of flexibility or flexible cooperatives
with respect to issues related to transactions costs, financial constraints and market
power.
5.2.2 Main Findings Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, we investigate renewable technology information asymmetries and
the effect on risk preferences of producers and retailers in sequential short-term
power markets. Across the world, the integration of renewable energy sources in
power systems is taking place in various ways and paces, resulting in a fierce ongoing
political combat between the various technologies (Hiroko, 2017). The forces at play
are driven by the decarbonization of generation portfolios, moving conventional power
plants toward intermittent renewable technologies, as well as the decentralization of
demand and control. Moreover, digital advances in the form of smart meters and
IoT devices have created opportunities for tech-savvy end-consumers and prosumers
to become increasingly, but not entirely, independent from the grid. In this work,
we study related risks of retailers and producers in these new volatile and uncertain
market environments.
We propose a multi-stage competitive equilibrium model, including intermittent
production on both sides of the market, to analyze price formation with different
renewable technologies in sequential power markets. We validate the model by an-
alyzing data in short-term forward and spot power markets in California and the
United Kingdom. Both markets have recently experienced a significant increase in
the share of renewable energy, respectively predominantly in terms of utility scale
and distributed sources. We find evidence for large-scale and distributed renewable
energy technologies to oppositely affect the forward premium, as asymmetries in the
ability to predict and gather information on renewable energy supply heterogeneously
influence risk preferences of producers and retailers, providing important insights on
the technology non-neutrality of renewable energy sources.
5.2.2.1 Limitations and Future Work Chapter 3
New forms of dynamic trading on electricity markets can be enabled by information
systems research, using real-time information streams and price signals to predict,
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analyze and steer bidding behavior. Therefore, one main direction for future work
is to benchmark the indicated value for information to the cost of IoT devices. The
indicated value for visibility of information should motivate retailers to stimulate, at
least partly, a more widespread roll-out of smart meters. This may ameliorate their
ability to predict and gather information, lowering risk-associated costs, and enhance
an efficient integration of decentralized renewable energy resources.
The main limitations of the study relate to the data quality and statistical method.
Forecasting accuracy depends on the numerical efficiency of the method employed, but
also on the ability to include important fundamental factors. Although we motivate
the model via an extensive multi-factor propositional framework, future work could
enhance the explanatory power of the model by including factors related to scarcity,
market power, spikes and higher moments of the spot price (Redl and Bunn, 2013).
Furthermore, we suppose measured data on predicted renewable generation to be
a good proxy for all available generation of a specific renewable technology in the
market. Wind and solar measurements are however often based on a combination of
computation, measurements and extrapolations, and are thus only assumed to be
representative for the respective entire generation portfolio. Lastly, whilst forward
price models focus on ex-ante expectations of spot price and premium realizations,
empirical analyses focus on an ex-post analyses of realized premiums. In future work,
this may be addressed by controlling for shocks to spot price expectations as well as
for the endogeneity of the premium with realized spot prices (Bunn and Chen, 2013).
5.2.3 Main Findings Chapter 4
In this chapter, we developed an experimental trading platform to analyze decision
making and price formation in short-term forward and spot power markets with
increasing supply uncertainty. The experimental approach allows us to exploit the fact
that in the laboratory one can implement the desired variations with a high degree
of control. Laboratory control has several virtues proven particularly useful when
studying electric power markets (Brandts et al., 2008). Where an empirical comparison
of the effects of production technologies on market pricing requires to be done over
an extensive period of time in order to collect sufficient high-quality data, there are
typically many other variables that change over time. Experimental control allows us
to isolate the effects of volume uncertainty via three market structures representing a
non-intermittent market, low intermittent market share and high intermittent market
share.
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We focus on the decision making of non-intermittent producers in forward and spot
markets and provide evidence for them to strategically shift focus from the forward
to the spot market. With increasing intermittent capacity, non-intermittent producers
bid lower volumes in the forward market in order to gain market share and profitable
positions in the spot market, as expected spot profits rise with increasing uncertainty,
indicating a convenience yield for flexibility. Moreover, we find that irrespective of
the actual demand for power in the spot market, i.e. imbalances occurring in real-
time, spot market power allows flexible non-intermittent producers to strategically
bid higher prices in spot markets. Analyzing these systems, relationships between
market participants, technology adaption and changes to market behavior provide
key ingredients for devising a robust well-functioning electricity market, its design
and its governing policies (Koolen et al., 2018).
5.2.3.1 Limitations and Future Work Chapter 4
The limitations in this chapter mainly relate to the experimental design of the
developed trading platform. The exploitative power of such models often reduces the
ecological validity, as Weron (2014) indicate that a number of exogenous variables
need to be defined; the number of players, the payoff and the operational market
structure next to the potential strategies and the way players interact. Although
we control for ecological validity and approximate variables with real-world values,
some design issues are difficult to overcome in our experimental setting. Follow-up
work could consider the implementation of multi-unit bidding, as risk and strategic
preferences vary across quantities and prices. Moreover, further experiments with
experienced traders could further strengthen the ecological validity of our results.
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Summary
Energy businesses are going through a series of swift and radical transformations to
meet the growing demands for sustainable energy. The integration of wind and solar
introduces more low marginal costs suppliers to power markets, as no fuels are needed
to produce electricity. Most power produced by renewable energy sources is however
variable and difficult to predict by nature, putting current power system operations
under pressure and causing prices to fluctuate heavily. Increased competition, new
production technologies and volatile prices completely changed operations in todays
power markets.
In this dissertation, we assess the integration of intermittent renewable energy
sources in relation to agents’ risk preferences and decision strategies in short-term
sequential power markets via a multi-method approach. First, we analytically identify a
technology-varying forward risk premium in relation to hedging needs of heterogeneous
producers and retailers. Second, we empirically validate a multi-factor propositional
framework, incorporating various renewable technologies, and provide evidence for
market non-neutralities between these technologies. Third, we indicate a convenience
yield for flexibility in a developed experimental trading environment and empirically
evaluate strategies of intermittent and non-intermittent producers in forward and
spot markets.
With the ongoing decarbonization, power markets should provide adequate price
signals for assets and investments to ensure an efficient and sustainable energy
transition. The work paves the way for policymakers to investigate the implications
of intermittent renewable energy sources on existing market structures and their
participants’ strategic space. It further devises key ingredients for well-functioning
sustainable power markets, its design and governing policies.

Nederlandse Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Energiemarkten doorgaan wereldwijd een radicale transformatie om te voldoen aan
de groeiende vraag naar duurzame energie. De integratie van wind- en zonne-energie
introduceerde meer producenten met lage marginale kosten in elektriciteitsmarkten,
aangezien deze geen (fossiele) brandstoffen nodig hebben. Hernieuwbaar gegenereerde
elektriciteit is echter meestal variabel en van nature moeilijk te voorspellen. In
combinatie met factoren zoals beperkte opslag en variable consumptie zorgt dit ervoor
dat huidige elektriciteitssytemen onder druk komen te staan en prijzen zeer volatiel
worden. Toegenomen competitie, nieuwe technologiee¨n en volatiele prijzen hebben
elektriciteitsmarkten drastisch veranderd.
In dit proefschrift bestuderen we via meerdere methodes het effect van de in-
tegratie van hernieuwbare energiebronnen op marktspelers hun risiscogedrag en
beslissingstrategiee¨n in korte termijncontracten. Eerst identificeren we analytisch een
technologisch-afhankelijke prijspremium tussen termijnmarkten, afhankelijk van de
mate waarin producenten en leveranciers hun risico afdekken. Ten tweede stellen we
een model voor met verscheidene hernieuwbare technologiee¨n en tonen empirisch het
effect aan van de ontstane informatieasymetriee¨n tussen marktspelers. Ten derde tonen
we het nut van flexibiliteit aan in een experimentele handelsomgeving en evalueren
empirisch het strategische biedingsgedrag van flexibele producenten in spot markten.
Het is van groot belang dat markten correcte prijssignalen geven om het decar-
boniseren van elektriciteitsmarkten te bewerkstelligen. Dit werk zet beleidsmakers
ertoe aan om de implicaties van variabele hernieuwbare energiebronnen in bestaande
marktstructuren te evaluaren vanuit zowel het perspectief van de markt als het indi-
vidu. Het bespreekt verder enkele belangrijke concepten om het verwezenlijken van
een efficien¨te en duurzame energietransitie mogelijk te maken.
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Market Risks and Strategies
in Power Systems
Integrating Renewable Energy
DERCK KOOLEN
Energy businesses are going through a series of swift and radical transformations to meet the growing 
demands for sustainable energy. The integration of wind and solar introduces more low marginal costs 
suppliers to power markets, as no fuels are needed to produce electricity. Most power produced by 
renewable energy sources is however variable and di  cult to predict by nature, putting current power 
system operations under pressure and causing prices to fl uctuate heavily. Increased competition, new 
production technologies and volatile prices completely changed operations in today’s power markets.
In this dissertation, we assess the integration of intermittent renewable energy sources in relation to 
agents’ risk preferences and decision strategies in short-term sequential power markets via a multi-
method approach. First, we analytically identify a technology-varying forward risk premium in relation to 
hedging needs of heterogeneous producers and retailers. Second, we empirically validate a multi-factor 
propositional framework, incorporating various renewable technologies, and provide evidence for market 
non-neutralities between these technologies. Third, we indicate a convenience yield for fl exibility in 
a developed experimental trading environment and empirically evaluate strategies of intermittent and 
non-intermittent producers in forward and spot markets.
With the ongoing decarbonization, power markets should provide adequate price signals for assets 
and investments to ensure an e  cient and sustainable energy transition. The work paves the way for 
policymakers to investigate the implications of intermittent renewable energy sources on existing market 
structures and their participants’ strategic space. It further devises key ingredients for well-functioning 
sustainable power markets, its design and governing policies.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in 
the fi eld of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is o  cially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the fi rm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfi rm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out fi rst rate research in management, and to o er an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the di erent research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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